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VICARIOUS CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF
ORGANIZATIONS: RICO AS AN EXAMPLE
OF A FLAWED PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE
PHILIP A. LACOVARA & DAVID P. NICOLI*
INTRODUCTION
Under the current federal doctrine of vicarious criminal liabil-
ity, an "organization"1 is held criminally responsible for crimes
committed by its agents within the scope of their employment and
with the intent to benefit the organization.' The scope of the doc-
trine is exceedingly broad; it imposes liability regardless of the
agent's position in the organization, 3 and even if the criminal con-
duct was in defiance of express company policy.' The doctrine also
does not discriminate; the multinational corporation with
thousands of employees whose field-level salesman commits a
criminal act5 is as criminally responsible as the small corporation
* Mr. Lacovara, former Deputy Solicitor General of the United States for criminal mat-
ters, is the managing director & general counsel of an investment banking firm. Mr. Nicoli
practices law in the Washington, D.C. office of Arnold & Porter.
I Unless otherwise noted, the term "organization" refers to all types of profit and non-
profit entities that the law recognizes as having a distinct existence separate from the people
who own, direct, or operate them, with the exception of government units, their subdivi-
sions, and agencies. Thus, the term refers to entities such as corporations, associations, part-
nerships, societies, and labor unions. Cf. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) ("words 'person' and 'whoever'
include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies and joint stock
companies").
2 See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (1979) [hereinafter Develop-
ments]. The differing approaches that the various states take with respect to imputed crimi-
nal liability are beyond the scope of this Article. For a general discussion of this area, see
Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J.
593, 629-34 (1988).
3 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962) ("corp-
oration may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even menial, employees").
4 See United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); United States v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
5 See generally 1 K. BRcKEY, CORPOATE CRiMINAL LLrBiLiTy § 3:04, at 57-58 (1984)
(because of corporate power to delegate authority to lower level employees, corporation
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whose president and sole stockholder engages in criminal conduct.'
The current breadth of the imputed criminal liability doctrine
has evolved because the federal courts have uncritically extended
the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior into the criminal
context.7 In so doing, these courts have premised expanded crimi-
nal liability for organizations on a civil doctrine concerned first
and foremost with the allocation of risk of loss caused by a harmful
event.' The obvious flaw in this approach, however, is that liability
based on respondeat superior does not require moral culpability, 9
which should be the basic and essential predicate underlying the
imposition of virtually any criminal liability, even on an
organization. 10
The shortcomings of respondeat superior in the criminal con-
text become particularly apparent when applied in conjunction
with the "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act"
("RICO")." Congress crafted RICO to play a very specific role in
the fight against organized crime in the United States.1 2 Through
its severe criminal penalties and civil treble damage remedies,
RICO was designed to thwart the infiltration of organized crime
into legitimate businesses." In actual practice, however, congres-
sional intent has not been followed. Instead, legitimate businesses
have become RICO's principal target. Perhaps no other factor has
led more directly to this perverse result than the misguided rules
of imputed organizational liability, respondeat superior, that many
federal courts have adopted in interpreting the RICO statute. 4
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code ("MP
Code")'" and the Brown Commission's proposed Federal Criminal
must remain responsible for their acts).
" See, e.g., United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16, 19-20 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949) (act of president held to be act of corporation).
7 See Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Pirr. L. REv. 21, 39 (1957).
8 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KFMON ON TORTS §
70, at 500-01 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
9 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 41-42.
10 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 (1978) (court
determined that "criminal offenses defined by the Sherman [Antitrust] Act should be con-
strued as including intent as an element").
11 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. 1990). On October 15, 1970, President
Nixon signed into law "The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970." See Pub. L. No. 91-452,
84 Stat. 941 (1970). Title IX of this package is the RICO statute. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
2 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981).
:3 See id.
14 See infra notes 71-111 and accompanying text.
15 MODEL PENAL CODE (1985) (as adopted at 1962 annual meeting of American Law
[Vol. 64:725
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Code ("FC Code")1 6 urge the adoption of more discriminating
standards of imputed criminal liability to remedy these serious
flaws in our federal jurisprudence. Both codes focus on the conduct
of high managerial officials in an organization to determine
whether liability for criminal activity requiring intent should be
imputed to the organization.1" Essentially, this focus views high-
level managerial officials as the "alter ego" of an organization be-
cause they establish and supervise the execution of the organiza-
tion's policies.18
The MP Code and FC Code ensure that organizational crimi-
nal liability will turn appropriately on the moral culpability of
those natural persons whose role in directing the affairs of the or-
ganization makes it fair and realistic to treat their conduct as a
proxy for the organization's culpability. 9 This more discerning fo-
cus seems to represent sounder public policy and is better attuned
to fundamental notions of criminal culpability. Thus, we urge in
this Article that the federal courts, which have fashioned the ex-
isting rules of imputed criminal liability without congressional
guidance or approval, reform those rules by adopting the principles
embodied in the MP Code and FC Code.
We also urge here that the courts adopt the principles embod-
ied in these approaches specifically with respect to organizational
liability under RICO. As previously noted, legitimate businesses
have become RICO's principal target, at least in applying the civil
Insitute in Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962).
16 See Final Report of the Nat'l Comm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (1971)
[hereinafter Final Report].
1" See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1985). The Model Penal Code and the proposed
Code provide for broader rules of organizational liability for strict liability crimes. See id. §
2.07(1)(a), (5); Final Report, supra note 16, § 402(1)(d). These proposals recognize that, for
some regulatory and health offenses, our jurisprudence permits criminal guilt without
fault-strict liability-even for natural persons. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658, 676-78 (1975) (corporation's president criminally liable Under federal Food and Drug
Act for failing to correct unsanitary warehouse conditions even though unaware of such con-
ditions). For a discussion of organizational liability for strict liability crimes and the stan-
dards for such liability, see Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Lia-
bility Offenses-Another View, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1342-46 (1982).
19 See, e.g., 1 K. BRIcKEY, supra note 5, § 3:01, at 39-40 ("officers and directors at the
policy-making level of the corporate hierarchy... responsible for the conduct of the com-
pany's business could be considered the 'alter ego' of the corporation and thus could be
treated as extensions of the legal entity").
'9 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1985) (explanatory note); Final Report, supra note 16,
§ 402 comment.
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remedy tucked into this criminal statute.2 0 Lenient and/or mis-
guided approaches to organizational liability under RICO have
been one of the main causes of the statute's errant aim 1.2 The
adoption of the principles embodied in the MP Code and proposed
FC Code approaches to organizational liability for resolving such
questions under RICO would go a long way toward redirecting the
aim of the statute to its proper targets-those entities whose lead-
ers engage in a morally culpable use of their organizational instru-
ments, and thus fairly brand them as "corrupt organizations. '22
Part I of this Article will trace the development of current
doctrines of imputed civil and criminal liability from their origin,
and demonstrate how the criminal doctrine grew-mindlessly-out
of the civil doctrine. Part II first will criticize this development in
the criminal doctrine for its unjustifiable departure from the fun-
damental precepts of criminal law. Part II then wil examine alter-
native approaches to the current federal imputed criminal liability
doctrine and propose that the federal courts adopt the general ap-
proach suggested by the MP and FC Codes, which focus on the
culpability of an organization's high-level managerial officials. Fi-
nally, Part III will discuss the rationale behind adopting this ap-
proach for RICO actions, since the indiscriminate use of respon-
deat superior actually has distorted and confounded the statute's
overarching goal of protecting legitimate organizations.
I. THE GENESIS AND CURRENT SCOPE OF ORGANIZATIONAL
LIABILITY STANDARDS IN THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEXT
Organizations such as corporations are abstract, "artificial"
entities 23 which typically lack the physical, mental, or moral capac-
20 See generally Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Report of the Ad
Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, ABA SEC. CORP., BANKING & Bus. LAW 55-56 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter ABA Report].
11 See Robinson v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 674 F. Supp. 243, 248 (E.D. Mich. 1987);
Lacovara & Nicoli, Refocusing the "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act"
on "Corrupt Organizations," 2 Civil RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at Part 2 (May 1987);
Wright, Organizational Responsibility for RICO Violations: Another Look, 10 RICO L.
Rep. 628, 629-30 (Nov. 1989); Note, Judicial Efforts to Redirect an Errant Statute: Civil
RICO and the Misapplication of Vicarious Corporate Liability, 65 B.U.L. REv. 561, 598-605
(1985).
22 Lacovara & Nicoli, supra note 21, at 1.
23 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)




ity to engage in wrongful conduct or to suffer punishment.2 4 Conse-
quently, early common law recognized that organizations could not
be held directly liable for torts and crimes committed by their em-
ployees or agents.2 5 Instead, the common law of torts applied the
doctrine of "imputed" liability, more often called "vicarious" lia-
bility or respondeat superior.e
A. Organizational Liability for Torts
Under "primitive law," torts committed by servants, slaves,
wives, and even inanimate objects were chargeable against their
"iowner.'' 7 Early English common-law courts, however, did not
hold the master liable for his servant's torts unless the master had
commanded the particular act at issue.28
The growing importance of commerce and industry and the
concomitant rise in the importance of corporations and other busi-
ness organizations, however, caused the common-law courts to re-
vise their position.2" Soon after 1700, common-law courts began to
impose vicarious liability on organizations for the tortious acts of
their agents.30 From that point on, the inexorable march of the
doctrine has been in the direction of more expansive organizational
liability.
Under the modern civil doctrine of imputed liability, an or-
ganization will be held vicariously liable for those torts of its
agents committed "within the scope of employment."3' As Dean
William Prosser and Professor Page Keeton have stated, however,
"[t]his highly indefinite phrase .. .is obviously no more than a
24 1 K. BRicR EY, supra note 5, § 2:01, at 14.
15 See id.
26 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 70, at 500. Roughly translated, the term respon-
deat superior means "let the higher up respond" to the demand for payment. Under this
doctrine, organizations-among other entities--came to be held vicariously liable for their
employees' tortious acts committed within the scope of employment. Id. Such vicarious lia-
bility "may well amount to absolute liability." Mueller, supra note 7.
27 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 70, at 500.
28 F. HARPER, F. JAIAEs & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.2, at 9 (2d ed. 1986) [here-
inafter HARPER & JAMES]; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 70, at 500.
29 1 K. BRicunY, supra note 5, § 2:02, at 16-17; HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 28; PROS-
SER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 70, at 500. See generally B. HUNT, THE DEvELOPMENT OF THE
BusiNEss CORPORATION iN ENGLA D 1800-67, at 116-43 (1969) (tracing development of corpo-
ration as means for providing limited liability for owners of business).
30 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 70.
21 HARPER & JAms, supra note 28, § 26.6, at 24; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(1) (1957).
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bare formula to cover the unordered and unauthorized acts of the
[employee] for which it is found to be expedient to charge the [em-
ployer] with liability. '32  As another commentator has put it,
"'[W]ithin the scope of employment' is a term of art signifying
little more than that the employee's ... [tort] must be committed
in connection with his performance of some job-related activity."3
Consequently, organizational liability under the "scope of employ-
ment" standard is extremely broad. Indeed, the "scope of employ-
ment" standard has been interpreted so broadly as to include acts
by an employee expressly forbidden by the employer.3 4
Courts have provided numerous reasons to justify an organiza-
tion's liability for the acts of its agents, 5 but the most widely ac-
cepted rationale is loss distribution.' The losses caused by an or-
ganization's employees are placed upon the organization because it
is "just" that the organization, rather than the innocent party,
bears any loss flowing from the employees' activities from which
the organization seeks to profit.37 Moreover, the organization is
better able to absorb the losses as a cost of doing business since it
can distribute the losses to society through increased prices for its
products or by procuring insurance.38
A second rationale for vicarious liability that has emerged
under modern law is its influence upon employer conduct. Al-
though seen as a makeweight argument by some,' vicarious liabil-
ity is deemed to give an organization greater incentive to be careful
32 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 70, at 502.
33 1 K. BRICaY, supra note 5, § 3:01, at 40.
3, HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 28, § 26.7, at 24-25.
31 PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 8, § 69, at 500.
[The principal] has a more or less fictitious "control" over the behavior of the
servant; he has "set the whole thing in motion," and is therefore responsible for
what has happened; he has selected the servant and trusted him, and so should
suffer for his wrongs, rather than an innocent stranger who has had no opportu-
nity to protect himself; it is a great concession that any man should be permitted
to employ another at all, and there should be a corresponding responsibility as the
price to be paid for it-or, more frankly and cynically, "In hard fact, the reason
for the employers' liability is the damages are taken from a deep pocket."
Id. (quoting T. BATY, VIcARIOUs LiABirrY 154 (1916)).
36 Id.
" Id. at 500-01. The unstated premise underlying this justification is, of course, that
the agent is likely to be judgment proof. See generally Note, An Efficiency Analysis of
Vicarious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168, 172 (1981) ("[a]nother
proposed justification for vicarious liability is that it spreads the costs of torts to principals
with 'deeper pockets' than their agents").
38 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 69, at 500-01.
39 Id.
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in the selection, instruction, and supervision of its employees, and
to take every precaution to see that the organization's business is
conducted safely.4"
Notably, the majority of federal courts have not deemed it ap-
propriate to impose vicarious liability on organizations with re-
spect to punitive damages.41 Punitive damages are awarded "for
the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching the defendant
not to do it again, and of deterring others from following the de-
fendant's example. ' 42 According to these courts, such purposes
would not be fulfilled by making an employer automatically liable
for the wanton acts of its low-level employees committed within
the scope of their employment, particularly where the employees'
acts contravene their employer's explicit policies and directions.4 3
Accordingly, these courts permit the award of punitive damages
40 Id.; see P. ATrYAH, VICAmous LiABiLrrY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 16 (1967) (liability on
employer encourages safer workplace); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 28, § 26.3, at 15 (liabil-
ity imposed on employer is "pressure put in the right place to avoid accidents"); James,
Vicarious Liability, 28 TuL. L. REv. 161, 163 (1954) (same). "[I]n more modern times it has
been suggested that control is an important factor because the person in control is the per-
son best placed to take precautions against accidents." P. ATrrAH, supra.
41 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 2, at 12. The great majority of the federal
courts follow this course as a result of the seminal decision of Lake Shore & Michigan S. Ry.
Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893), where the Supreme Court held that an organization had
to authorize or ratify its agent's tortious acts before it could be held liable for punitive
damages. Id. at 115; see, e.g., Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 845 F.2d 347, 354-55 (1st Cir.
1988) (bareboat charterer not liable for punitive damages for employees' intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress because of absence of authorization or ratification); United States
v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1966) (defendant employer not liable for
double damages because "knowledge or guilty intent... will not be imputed to the em-
ployer"). But cf. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556, 575 n.14 (1982) (dicta criticizing Prentice). Some federal courts have somewhat ex-
panded the Prentice rule to permit the imposition of punitive damages on an organization
pursuant to section 217C of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY (1957) or section 909 of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). Even those standards, however, are more re-
strictive than the conventional respondeat superior doctrine. See infra note 44 and accom-
panying text; see also Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 1985)
(reversal of punitive damages possible where there is "a lack of evidence connecting the
[tort] with responsible officials"); Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. Northern Pac. Grain
Growers, 767 F.2d 1379, 1385 (9th Cir. 1985) (grain terminal owner not liable for punitive
damages for unauthorized or unratified acts of foreman).
On the other hand, a majority of the state courts have held that the vicarious liability of
an organization for acts of an agent committed within the scope of his employment extends
to punitive as well as compensatory damages, even in the absence of approval or ratification
by the organization. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 2, at 13.
42 PROSSER & KETON, supra note 8, § 2, at 9.
43 Such courts also lay "stress upon the injustice of a punishment inflicted upon one
who has been entirely innocent throughout." Id. § 2, at 12.
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against employers only in situations where there is a showing of
more than a mere employment relationship. 44 For example, mana-
gerial authorization, ratification or recklessness must be shown as
well, or the tortfeasor himself must be a "managerial agent" acting
within the scope of his employment.
In sum, with the possible exception of the punitive damages
context, respondeat superior principles and their application in
the civil law context arouse little controversy today.4 5 Indeed, it is
no exaggeration to say that "[n]o legal doctrine has been . . . so
generally adhered to by the courts as the doctrine of respondeat
superior."46
B. Organizational Liability for Crimes
In sharp contrast to organizational liability for civil damages,
organizational criminal liability in the United States is essentially
a recent innovation; it began in earnest early in this century. 7
Since then, and particularly in the last several decades, society has
witnessed a "sweeping expansion" of organizational criminal liabil-
ity.48 In fact, this sweeping expansion has come about-at least in
the federal courts-largely because standards for organizational
criminal liability have been borrowed directly, but uncritically,
from the civil doctrine of respondeat superior.e
At common law, employees were indictable for criminal acts
committed in the course of their employment.50 The employing or-
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 909 (1977); see also Muratore, 845 F.2d at 354-56 ("[u]nder the strict complicity
rule, the court [before awarding punitive damages] must determine whether or not there
was knowledge or ratification on the part of the principal").
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if: (a) the principal authorized the doing
and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reck-
less in employing him, or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and
was acting with the scope of his employment, or (d) the principal or a managerial
agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957).
45 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 69, at 501 ("the tendency is clearly to justify
[vicarious liability]... and gradually to extend it").
4' Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 452 (1923).
4" See Developments, supra note 2, at 1246.
41 Miller & Levine, Recent Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability, 24 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 41, 41 (1984).
49 Id.
50 See generally 1 K. BRICKEY, supra note 5, § 1:05, at 11 ("corporate officers and
agents ... personally liable for criminal misconduct they engage in").
[Vol. 64:725
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ganizations themselves, however, were immune from criminal lia-'
bility.5 ' They were viewed as abstractions that lacked both the
physical and moral capacity to engage in criminal conduct and
were unable to suffer punishment, such as jail or death, typically
accorded to violators of the criminal laws.
52
The increased economic and social role played by business or-
ganizations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries began to
erode the doctrine, just as it had under the civil law. Slowly but
surely, courts began to impose criminal liability on organizations;
by the mid-nineteenth century, municipal and commercial corpora-
tions commonly were convicted on charges of public nuisance and
nonfeasance. 4 Organizational criminal liability was extended soon
thereafter to acts of misfeasance.5"
It took until the beginning of this century, however, for the
principle to emerge that organizations are responsible for crimes
that require a general or specific intent.5 In New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad Co. v United States,57 the Supreme Court
of the United States, in an opinion written by Justice Day for a
unanimous Court, expressly abandoned what it termed the "old
and exploded doctrine" of corporate immunity from criminal pros-
ecution; the Court emphasized its concern that many offenses
might otherwise go unpunished." The Court's conclusion was re-
markable because it fashioned a whole new category of federal
criminal liability, repudiating common-law principles, without di-
rection from Congress. Stating that it could not "shut its eyes to
the fact that the great majority of business transactions in modern
times are conducted through these bodies,"5 " the Court asserted
(in a characteristic burst of judicial activism) that it is "in the in-
terest of public policy" to hold organizations vicariously liable for
"I See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492
(1909) ("corporation is not indictable, although the particular members of it are") (citing
Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518, 1518 (K.B. 1701)); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 464 (1765) ("corporation cannot commit treaton [sic], or felony, or other
crime in it's [sic] corporate capacity- though it's [sic] members may, in their distinct indi-
vidual capacities").
52 1 K. BmcKEy, supra note 5, § 2:01, at 14.
53 Id.; see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
5 1 K. BRucKEY, supra note 5, § 2:01, at 15.
Id.
"Id.
" 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
"Id. at 495.
B9 Id. at 495-96.
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intent-based crimes committed by employees or agents acting
within the scope of their employment.60
In retrospect, it may not seem astounding that the Court re-
jected the old metaphysical notion that an organization is unable
to bear responsibility for a crime; yet the Court's uncritical trans-
fusion of tort principles into the criminal law context, 1 without
recognizing or reconciling the important policy differences animat-
ing these distinct bodies of law, is unpersuasively indiscriminate.
Indeed, the Court stated with virtually no analysis of these issues
that it was merely extending the respondeat superior concept as a
"step further" to the criminal law.2 Under the new standard, the
Court thus sanctioned holding organizations criminally liable for
the acts of their employees when the employees (1) commit crimes
(2) within the scope of employment and (3) with an intent to bene-
fit the organization. 3
Since that time, federal courts have read this judicially crafted
standard of organizational criminal liability very broadly, despite
the maxim of "strict construction" purportedly applied to criminal
laws.6 4 In effect, the intent and actions of agents are imputed di-
rectly to the organization for liability purposes; it is as though the
agents were the organization. 5
0 Id. at 494.
61 See id.
02 Id.
I See id., see also United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 124-27 (1958)
("treasury of the business may not ... obtain the fruits of violations ... committed know-
ingly by agents of the entity in the scope of their employment"); Developments, supra note
2, at 1247 ("respondeat superior doctrine of corporate criminal liability ... is common-law
rule in the federal ... and most state courts").
04 See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997, 1007 (1990) (in construing crimi-
nal statute leniency must be used and if any ambiguity over its scope remains, "it should be
resolved in [defendant's] favor unless and until Congress plainly states that we have miscon-
strued its intent"); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973) (criminal statute
requires that "any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity").
6" See, e.g., Brickey, supra note 2, at 628-29 (respondeat superior rule mandates that
"if the corporation has entrusted the miscreant agent with responsibility for the function he
is performing, he is deemed to act and speak for the corporation when he unlawfully trans-
acts its business"). Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to adopt a "collective knowl-
edge" theory of organizational criminal liability where the knowledge of an organization's
agents is aggregated for purposes of demonstrating the requisite scienter for any given
crime. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir.) ("collec-
tive knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the context of corporate criminal liabil-
ity"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Inc., 381 F. Supp.
730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974) ("corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowl-
edge of its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act accordingly"). Under the
[Vol. 64:725
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Proof of the agent's intent to commit an act to benefit the or-
ganization can be satisfied, at least in part, even if the employee
was acting primarily for his own advantage6 6 and the organization
did not actually benefit from the agent's criminal acts.6 7 Circum-
stantial evidence demonstrating that the agent had engaged in job-
related activity will satisfy this element.6 '
Thus, under the current federal doctrine, the organization
bears the stigma, penalties, and disqualifications flowing from
criminal guilt if a low-level employee defies management's earnest
efforts to comply with the law and misuses his position to commit
a crime primarily motivated by a desire to benefit himself. Charac-
terizing the organization's imputed responsibility as criminal is, at
best, an artificial construction. To impute guilt in these circum-
stances is both unfair to the organization, and inconsistent with
fundamental concepts of criminal culpability.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the expansive use of re-
spondeat superior principles in the criminal context continues to
spark controversy,69 even though the doctrine has taken firm root
in the federal courts. 0 A critical reexamination of the current doc-
trine is especially timely, since its sweeping use continues un-
abated and perversely taints the application of RICO, a statute in-
tended to protect legitimate organizations from criminals.
collective knowledge theory, an organization can be held criminally liable even where none
of its agents or employees had the requisite scienter to be convicted of the same crime.
" See United States v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir.
1985) ("[tio be acting within the scope of his employment, an agent must be 'performing
acts of the kind he is authorized to perform, and those acts must be motivated-at least in
part-by an intent to benefit the corporation"' (quoting United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d
238, 242 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982)) (emphasis added)).
67 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1962)
("act is no less the principal's if from such intended conduct either no benefit accrues, a
bQnefit is undiscernible, or, for that matter, the result turns out to be adverse").
" See, e.g., Developments, supra note 2, at 1250 (engaging in job-related activity, by
definition, is designed to benefit employer).
19 See, e.g., Brickey, supra note 2, at 596 ("corporate criminal responsibility [is] a
weed"); Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and
Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141, 1144 (1983) (many commentators urge replacement of
corporate criminal sanctions with civil remedies); Mueller, supra note 7, at 23 ("rationale of
corporate criminal liabilty is all but clear").
71 Brickey, supra note 2, at 593.
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND THE NEED FOR
MORALLY CULPABLE CONDUCT
A. The Misapplication of Respondeat Superior in the Criminal
Law Context
When the Supreme Court extended respondeat superior prin-
ciples into the criminal context,7 1 it also commented that "the law
should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of corporations
no less than to those of individuals."7 2 Such a concept is consistent
with the principle that a corporation is a "person" entitled to most
of the same constitutional rights as are extended to natural per-
sons, including the guarantees of the first amendment, the fourth
amendment, and the due process clause.73
The Court's holding in New York Central, however, did not
adequately protect the rights of the corporate "person." Instead,
organizations have come to be held vicariously liable under the
criminal law based solely on the conduct of other persons, i.e.,
their employees or agents. Individuals, in dramatic contrast to or-
ganizations, are exposed to criminal liability only for their own ille-
gal conduct when accompanied by a mental state evincing some
personal moral culpability.7 4
An intellectually defensible rationale for this disparate treat-
ment is sorely lacking.76 The primary objectives of the criminal law
71 New York Central, 212 U.S. at 494; see supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
72 New York Central, 212 U.S. at 495.
71 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (corporation
protected by first amendment); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (fourth amendment protection); Pembina Consol. Silver Mining and Milling Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1888) (corporations are properly considered persons
under due process clause).
' See, e.g., Developments, supra note 2, at 1241 (mental state of defendant "deter-
mines his moral culpabilty... [b]ut mental state has no meaning when applied to a corpo-
rate defendant, since an organization possesses no mental state"). Individuals may be held
criminally liable for the acts of others with respect to a limited class of "provision[s] safe-
guarding the public welfare" even "though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting."
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943); see United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658, 671-72 (1975). Aside from this limited context, however, "criminal offenses requiring no
mens rea have a 'generally disfavored status.'" Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426
(1985). Individuals would likely have a strong due process argument were they to be held
strictly liable for the criminal acts of others. No case has yet addressed this issue for organi-
zations, but there is no reason why an organization could not make a similarly strong due
process argument. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
71 Mueller, supra note 7, at 37-38; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 comment at 332
(1985). Modern development of corporate criminal liability "has proceeded largely without
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are deterrence and retribution. Deterrence is the effort to coerce
"the actual or potential wrongdoer to compliance with the set stan-
dards of society through the threat or application of sanctions,
which are actual deterrent influences acting upon the minds of po-
tential or actual wrongdoers. '7' Retribution is the theory "that
every crime demands payment in the form of punishment."' 7
These twin goals are interdependent; when deterrence fails, the
criminal law imposes liability, but only where the actor has en-
gaged in "conscious wrongdoing" which is, in the eyes of the law,
"morally culpable.17 8
Since the element of moral culpability is fundamental to the
proper application of the criminal law, generally deterrence is not
sufficient to justify criminal prosecution and punishment unless
the defendant actually engaged in the misconduct personally or ex-
pressly authorized and directed the misconduct. As the Supreme
Court explained in United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,79
the element of moral culpability must be present if a criminal
sanction is to "square with the generally accepted functions of the
criminal law." 80
Instead of employing the doctrine of imputed guilt when a
natural person is involved, the federal criminal law properly limits
culpability only to a person who actively "conspires" with the
wrongdoer, 81 or "willfully causes" the offense, or actively "aids,
reference to any intelligible body of principle and the field is characterized by the absence of
articulate analysis of the objectives thought to be attainable by imposing criminal fines on
corporate bodies." Id.; see also Mueller, supra note 7, at 23 (reasoning behind corporate
criminal liability is highly unclear and appears to be "without rationale whatsoever"); De-
velopments, supra note 2, at 1241 ("no single, broadly accepted theory of corporate blame-
worthiness ... justifies the imposition of criminal penalties on corporations").
" Mueller, supra note 7, at 37-38 (emphasis added).
7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1184 (5th ed. 1979).
78 Mueller, supra note 7, at 38; see also Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Princi-
ple Extended to its Limits, 38 FED. B.J. 49, 49 n.3 (1979) (basic premise of criminal juris-
prudence that guilt requires personal fault).
79 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
11 Id. at 442 (citations omitted); see Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985).
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by inten-
tion is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and
duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
Id. (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)); see also Mueller, supra
note 7, at 29 (mens rea is "basis of all criminal law"); Developments, supra note 2, at 1238
(criminal sanctions only proper when perpetrator is morally culpable).
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
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abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission." S2
Thus, for example, one would never expect the prosecution of the
dean of a law school because one of his employees-a faculty mem-
ber, perhaps-tried to increase the passing rate of the school's
graduates on the bar exam by bribing the bar examiners. In the
absence of the dean's personal participation in the scheme, the
mere employer-employee relationship or even a negligent failure to
prevent the crime would not serve as an adequate basis for brand-
ing the dean a criminal. Quite properly, then, the concept of re-
spondeat superior liability is not extended into the criminal law
context when an individual employer is involved.83 Yet, the critical
test of personal culpability vanishes when the employer is a corpo-
rate, rather than natural, person.
Imputed liability of an employer should only apply civilly. The
primary function of tort law is compensation-"distributing the
loss of a harmful occurrence."84 The ability to pay for injury
caused by wrongful conduct is the paramount policy concern gov-
erning civil imputed liability.8 Unlike criminal law, tort liability
does not necessarily turn on the moral blameworthiness of the of-
fending actor. As one commentator has stated: "Moral culpability
is of secondary importance in tort law-immoral conduct is sim-
ply one of the various ways by which individuals suffer economic
damage. But in penal law.., the immorality of the actor's conduct
is essential-whereas pecuniary damage is entirely irrelevant."8
Given the differing purposes of tort law and criminal law, it is
not entirely unexpected that uncritically applying principles'from
the former to the latter may lead to absurd results. For instance, it
is difficult to discern how an organization may be considered mor-
ally culpable for the acts of low-level agents who engaged in crimi-
nal conduct that violated well-known and strictly enforced organi-
zational policy. 7 Similarly, it is difficult to perceive the logic
82 Id. § 2.
88 See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962) (company official liable for
antitrust conspiracy only when he "authorizes, orders, or helps perpetrate" offense).
84 Mueller, supra note 7, at 38; see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (innocent
plaintiff should not bear loss where there is party closer to fault and able to bear cost of
injury).
85 See, e.g., PROSSER & KE TON, supra note 8, § 69, at 500 (deep pocket is reason for
placing liability on employer).
86 J. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 203 (1947) (emphasis added).
87 See Developments, supra note 2, at 1242 ("it is unfair to impute to the corporation
the intent of a lone agent without also considering whether conscientious efforts were made
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behind holding an organization morally culpable for the criminal
acts of agents who disregard express instructions from a diligent
supervisor or who commit crimes despite the organization's good
faith efforts to prevent such conduct. Yet, criminal liability in
those circumstances is precisely what the application of respon-
deat superior in the criminal context permits.88
It is no answer for proponents of respondeat superior-based
criminal liability to say that the organization is morally culpable in
these scenarios merely because an organizational agent-regardless
of his level-committed a crime.' Even the federal common law of
torts is not so harsh in this regard, since an organization tradition-
ally is not subject to vicarious liability for punitive damages as-
sessed against an organization's agent who acted within the scope
of employment.90 Since punitive damages in a civil case ordinarily
require a showing of managerial-level involvement (at least the
reckless disregard for the subordinate's wrongdoing), imputation of
criminal liability should, at a minimum, require a showing of simi-
lar managerial involvement.
Further, to "whose actus reus," and to "whose mens rea"
should the law logically turn in its search for the moral culpability
that should accompany any finding of criminal liability? 91 The cur-
rent application of respondeat superior does not adequately an-
swer this question. It fails to explain why an organizational em-
ployer should be deemed "morally culpable" when it is unfair and
unconscionable automatically to attribute moral culpability to an
individual employer absent evidence of his personal complicity.
Of course, the fact that respondeat superior does not fit neatly
by other agents to prevent the crime"); cf. Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2,
8 (6th Cir. 1946) (corporation not liable for unauthorized act of its agent); John Gund Brew-
ing Co. v. United States, 204 F. 17, 20 (8th Cir.) (corporation not liable when agent acts in
direct violation of orders), modified, 206 F. 386 (8th Cir. 1913).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 339, 407 (4th Cir.
1985) (employer liable for acts of agents within scope of employment, even if actions are
contrary to policy of employer); United States v. Bavic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956, 1008 (1983) (corporate intent shown by acts of employees,
even if corporate officers are without knowledge); United States v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 467
F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (liability may attach
without proof that conduct was within agent's actual authority, and even if contrary to ex-
press instructions).
88 See, e.g., Developments, supra note 2, at 1242 (respondeat superior theory "consid-
ers the corporation morally responsible for the acts and intents of each of its agents").
go See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing purpose behind punitive
damages and why not appropriate here).
81 Mueller, supra note 7, at 40.
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into any particular conceptual model is not dispositive. As one
court has aptly stated, the "law as a useful tool must accommodate
pure theoretical logic to the demands of common sense." 2 Thus,
the application of respondeat superior in the criminal law context
might be proper if such liability were "a necessary and useful
thing."93 Respondeat superior liability, however, is neither; no jus-
tification can possibly overcome criminal law's fundamental re-
quirement that a finding of moral culpability accompany any im-
position of criminal liability.
As previously stated, the principal reason that the New York
Central Court incorporated the respondeat superior doctrine into
the criminal law context was to deter unlawful corporate conduct.94
The deterrence rationale, however, cannot survive even a moment's
scrutiny. Assuming, arguendo, that some offenses go unpunished if
organizations are not held vicariously liable for their employees'
criminal acts, it is nonetheless an insufficient justification to im-
pose vicarious criminal liability on organizations for all crimes
committed by their agents within the scope of employment. Re-
spondeat superior in the criminal context, nonetheless, imposes
criminal liability on organizations irrespective of any mitigating
circumstances that may exist on the organization's behalf.
The major flaw in the rationale is that it is simply wrong to
assert that, unless the organization is prosecuted, the offense "may
go unpunished." The primary focus of criminal prohibitions and
penalties is on controlling the behavior of human actors. Thus,
even without organizational liability, criminal law deters agents of
organizations by punishing the agents in their individual capacities
for their criminal activity.9 5 It is well settled that the individual
actor cannot escape personal criminal liability merely because he
was acting on behalf of an organization. How, then, does respon-
deat superior liability, resulting only in fines to organizations, pro-
vide any greater deterrence to employees than does the threat of
personal liability, which potentially could result in
92 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962).
" Mueller, supra note 7, at 23.
94 See, e.g., New York Central, 212 U.S. at 493-95 (rejecting doctrine that corporation
cannot commit crime); Miller, supra note 78, at 50 (primary justification for placing crimi-
nal liablity on corporations is to deter criminal behavior); Comment, Is Corporate Criminal
Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 919-20 (1975) (deterrence should be principle
purpose underlying imposition of corporate criminal liability); Developments, supra note 2,
at 1246 (respondeat superior provides high level of deterrence).




Moreover, the Supreme Court's original rationale for imputed
criminal liability-the need for deterrence-finds only slim sup-
port in modern practicalities. Numerous other civil, regulatory,
and societal penalties now deter undesirable organizational crimi-
nal conduct in ways that make superfluous the imposition of orga-
nizational criminal liability based on respondeat superior. Indeed,
many criminal offenses attributed to corporations involve conduct
subject to close government supervision under various regulatory
schemes. Moreover, for the sake of reputation and good business
practice, an organization has a strong and even compelling incen-
tive to prevent its agents from committing crimes in its name, even
without facing criminal exposure itself.
Since the Supreme Court first extended respondeat superior
into the criminal arena, legislatures have empowered both govern-
ments and private parties with a significant arsenal of civil reme-
dies for improper conduct committed by representatives of organi-
zations. State and federal statutes dealing with racketeering, 97
antitrust,98 labor union activities,9 and consumer protection °" ex-
ist to punish organizations. Such statutes provide civil penalties or
treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees for public and private
actions against offending organizations.101 In addition, both public
and private parties may bring to bear against offending organiza-
tions scores of double-damage and single-damage statutory reme-
dies, as well as innumerable common-law causes of action that pro-
vide for the award of punitive damages against miscreant agents
and truly culpable organizations. 10 2
"e See, e.g., Linan, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YAIE L.J. 630, 630-31
(1977) (to business person "prison is the inferno, and conventional risk-reward analysis
breaks down when the risk is jail"); Developments, supra note 2, at 1245 (possibility of jail
term encourages employees to forego illegally-obtained corporate profits).
"' See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §8 1961-1964 (1988 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20
(McKinney 1989).
11 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 38 12-27 (1988); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw H8 340-347 (McKinney
1988).
" See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-158 (1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW §8 720-732 (McKinney 1988).
100 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 205-265 (1988); N.Y. ExEc. LAW 88 550-553 (McKinney 1982).
101 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 60-67 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (any person may
maintain action for damages against any person who has committed antitrust violation);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (civil remedy available to any person
against another person or organization violating racketeering statute); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &
R. 1353 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1991) (civil remedy after person or enterprise convicted
under § 460.20 of Penal Law).
102 See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
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Since the government and private parties generally can prove
these "offenses" by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than
by the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, respondeat
superior simply provides no additional deterrence. 10 If anything,
the less burdensome evidentiary standard by which organizations
can be held liable in the civil context justifies the expectation that
the prospect of substantial civil liability would serve as a greater
deterrent to organizations and their agents than possible criminal
organizational liability.
Furthermore, societal penalties are significantly higher today
than they were when the Supreme Court extended general respon-
deat superior principles to criminal law. Mass communication has
made it far less likely that an organization can escape the oppro-
brium that accompanies the public discovery that an organization's
agents have engaged in criminal activity.' In the criminal context,
therefore, respondeat superior does not provide enough additional
deterrence to justify disregarding criminal law's traditional re-
quirement of moral culpability. In fact, alternative organizational
556, 565-66 (1982) (agency law concepts apply to civil antitrust violations); United States v.
O'Connell, 890 F.2d 563, 568 (1st Cir. 1989) (agency theory applied to False Claims Act,
holding corporation liable); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1361-
62 (3rd Cir. 1987) (vicarious liability for employer of RICO persons appropriate even if em-
ployer is RICO enterprise).
103 Given the availability of these civil remedies to governments and private individu-
als, there is also little reason to believe that, without respondeat superior in the criminal
context, organizations would "benefit from what is ostensibly [their] own wrongdoing." 1 K.
BicKEY, supra note 5, § 1:04, at 10.
I"' See The Consumer and the Federal Trade Commission-A Critique of the Con-
sumer Protection Record of the FTC, 115 CONG. REc. E370, 2389 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1969)
("threat of prompt, effective and widespread publicity about objectionable corporate behav-
ior must finally be recognized" as "large corporations are remarkably thin-skinned").
The FTC is "empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations
... from using . . . unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15
U.S.C.A. § 45(2) (West Supp. 1990). Such methods are declared unlawful. Id. § 45(1). The
FTC has the power "to gather and compile information and to investigate.., any...
corporation engaged in [such]." Id. § 46(a). Also, the FTC has the power "to make public
... such portions of the information obtained by it hereunder as are in the public interest."
Id. § 46(0; see, e.g., FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308,
1313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (FTC authorized to alert public by "factual press releases" when
defendant suspected of illegal activities). The purpose of the Federal Trade Commission Act
is to protect the public and may at its own discretion publicize information to alert the
public to "suspected violations of the law by factual press releases whenever [corporation] is
engaged in activities made unlawful by the Act." Id.; see also Study Draft of the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 33 (1970) (adverse publicity authorized




penalties provide a more effective deterrent than does artificially
attributed respondeat superior criminal liability.
Courts and commentators have proffered other subsidiary jus-
tifications in support of respondeat superior criminal liability de-
spite criminal law's traditional moral culpability requirement. For
instance, some argue that the respondeat superior criminal stan-
dard will encourage better employer supervision of employee con-
duct 0 5 by using the threat of criminal liability to force one person
to control the conduct of another. However, its current application
extends imputed criminal liability well beyond any reasonable
boundaries; the organization may bear criminal guilt for the
agent's offense, even if it has done everything possible to encourage
the agent's compliance with the law.
Others have argued that respondeat superior is necessary to
prevent organizations from evading criminal liability by delegating
to low-level subordinates full responsibility for activities that may
lead to criminal violations. 06 A similar argument has been asserted
that respondeat superior liability is necessary lest managerial
agents convey to low-level employees an implicit understanding
that they wish to remain insulated from information that would
infect them with knowledge of those employees' criminal con-
duct.107 Although criminal law undoubtedly should punish the or-
ganization and its managers when they purposefully induce their
subordinates to commit crimes or to keep management ignorant of
foreseeable misconduct, respondeat superior is unfairly overbroad
in the criminal arena. The standard for attributing guilt to the or-
ganization should not be the automatic, inflexible, and widesweep-
ing doctrine of respondeat superior.
Finally, proponents of respondeat superior liability assert that
in large, modern-day business organizations, "high ranking officers
105 See Miller, supra note 78, at 50 ("main justification" for respondeat superior crimi-
nal liability is it promotes careful supervision over corporate affairs by managers); 1 U.S.
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 190 (1970)
[hereinafter Working Papers] (sanctioning corporations directly assumes primary goal of
corporate penalty is diligent supervision over corporate personnel by corporate managers
where corporation bound by behavior of inferior personnel).
106 See Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 277, 275 N.E.2d 33, 84
(1971) ("[w]e believe that stringent standards must be adopted to discourage any attempt
by 'endocratic' corporations' executives to place the sole responsibility for criminal acts on
the shoulders of their subordinates"), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972); 1 K. BRICKEY, supra
note 5, § 1:04, at 9; Developments, supra note 2, at 1254.
107 Developments, supra note 2, at 1254.
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and executives may have little or no involvement with many im-
portant aspects of the business, whereas lower echelon employees
may exercise broad responsibility in carrying out the corporation's
day-to-day operations.' ' 108 Thus, they object, large organizations
would, in all likelihood, be immune from criminal liability unless
courts apply the strict liability respondeat superior standard. 10 9
This argument is clearly overbroad; it erroneously assumes
that any narrower standard of organizational liability would lead
to de facto immunity for large organizations. More legitimate stan-
dards would preserve significant and more carefully crafted areas
of organizational liability." 0 Indeed, quite the opposite makes
more sense: it is less justifiable to impute the unauthorized acts of
low-level employees to larger organizations. Thus, if the exclusive
agent of a small organization commits a crime in the course of con-
ducting its affairs, there is at least some superficial reason to con-
clude that the criminal act reflects the way the organization is pur-
suing its goals. By contrast, if one low-level employee in an
enterprise with several thousand employees commits an offense,
the misconduct may be so aberrational that it is inequitable to
equate the employee's guilt with the organization's culpability.
Simply put then, no logical or practical rationale justifies the
application of traditional respondeat superior principles to the
criminal context, or its concomitant disregard for criminal law's es-
sential precept that criminal guilt should reflect genuine moral cul-
pability. Because mens rea "is the very fundament of our Anglo-
American criminal law,""' it should provide the necessary touch-
stone of any legal doctrine that imputes criminal liability to an
organization.
"08 Brickey, supra note 2, at 626; see Beneficial, 360 Mass. at 275, 275 N.E.2d at 83
(lower-level employees often have more responsibility in everyday activities within corpora-
tion than directors or officers); Developments, supra note 2, at 1254. "Larger, multidivi-
sional organizations generally maintain a layer of top managers who reserve their own ener-
gies for policymaking, coordination, and program evaluation, and delegate responsibility for
day-to-day operations to middle-level employees." Id.
109 See Brickey, supra note 2, at 626 (adopting standard narrower than respondeat su-
perior for large organizations will result in rule of non-liability); Developments, supra note
2, at 1254-55 (narrowing of respondeat superior standard would allow large corporations,
whose top officials are too removed from daily operations, to avoid conviction).
:1 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
1 Mueller, supra note 7, at 46.
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B. The Necessity of Focusing on the Conduct of an Organiza-
tion's Management
' Once moral culpability is elevated to its rightful place in fash-
ioning organizational criminal liability, the crucial question can be
accurately framed: Which agent's conduct should be examined in
order to determine the propriety of imposing imputed liability?
British courts have provided an answer similar to our own common
law: Through an "anthropomorphic sleight of hand," the inanimate
organization is transformed "into a 'person' capable of committing
criminal delicts and harboring criminal intent. ' 112 British law,
however, has been far more exacting and discriminating in its ex-
amination of the actual workings of the organizational "person."
Specifically, British courts have observed:
Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents
who are nothing more than hands to do the work .... Others are
directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will
of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of
these managers is the state of the mind of the company and is
treated by the law as such.113
The drafters of the MP Code and the FC Code have provided
a similar answer: Both codes would limit organizational criminal
liability to situations where "high managerial agents" responsible
for making and supervising the implementation of company policy
were personally involved in performing or sanctioning the criminal
deeds. 14 We advocate the adoption of this same approach for or-
ganizational criminal liability in the federal courts. If this sug-
gested approach is followed, organizational criminal liability will
then return to the fundamental mooring of criminal law-moral
culpability.
The FC Code grew out of a commission established by Con-
gress and appointed by the President to review the substantive
112 Brickey, supra note 2, at 593.
11 H.L. Bolton Eng'r Co. v. T.S. Graham & Sons, I Q.B. 159, 172 (C.A. 1957). "[A]U
those officers, whether elected or appointed, who direct, supervise and manage the corpora-
tion within its business sphere and policy-wise [are] the 'inner circle.' They are the mens,
the mind or brain, of the corporation." Mueller, supra note 7, at 41.
I" See MODEL PENAL. CODE § 2.07(1)(1985); see also Brickey, supra note 2, at 596 (MP
Code adopts scheme of organizational liability that distinguishes between "'hands' of the
corporation and the policy makers who constitute its 'mind' "); Final Report, supra note 16,
§ 402 comment at 35 (vicarious liability of corporations should approximate accomplice
liability).
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federal criminal law."l5 Although the commission could hardly be
called a tool of large organizations, one of its most fundamental
reforms, in its Final Report in 1971, was to revise significantly the
federal standards for imputing criminal liability to corporations." 6
The FC Code standard for corporate liability is premised on
the view that vicarious liability of corporations should resemble or-
dinary accomplice liability.1 7  The FC Code corporate liability
standard identifies the persons in management whose complicity is
required before the courts may impose criminal liability for felo-
nies." The proposed FC Code specifically lists the board of direc-
115 The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws was established by
Congress in 1966 to undertake a complete review and to recommend revision of the federal
criminal laws. The Commission became popularly known as the "Brown Commission," be-
cause its Chairman was the former Democratic Governor of California, Edmund G. Brown.
Brown was appointed Chairman of the Commission by President Lyndon Johnson. The re-
maining members of the Commission consisted of a bipartisan array of congressmen and
senators, three federal judges, and two practicing attorneys. See Final Report, supra note
16, at app. B. The composition of the Commission most assuredly protected it against accu-
sations of being a tool of Fortune 500 companies.
116 The drafters of the proposed FC Code, without explanation, limited their revised
standards to corporations. See id. at 37 (unincorporated association liability "is left to spe-
cific statutory provisions and judicial development"). The Commission's staff, on the other
hand, had concluded that incorporated and unincorporated associations should be subject to
the same standards. See Working Papers, supra note 105, at 165, 182 n.58.
17 See Final Report, supra note 16, § 402, at 35. The Report provides that corpora-
tions may be convicted of felonies as follows:
(1) Liability Defined. A corporation may be convicted of: (a) any offense commit-
ted by an agent of the corporation within the scope of his employment on the
basis of conduct authorized, requested or commanded, by any of the following or a
combination of them:
(i) the board of directors;
(ii) an executive officer or any other agent in a position of comparable authority
with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a manage-
rial capacity of subordinate employees;
(iii) any person, whether or not an officer of the corporation, who controls the
corporation or is responsibly involved in forming its policy; [and]
(iv) any other person for whose acts or omissions the statute defining the offense
provides corporate responsibility for offenses.
Id. § 402(1)(a)(i)-(iv). In addition, the proposed FC Code would permit corporations to be
convicted of any offense, including a felony, "consisting of an omission to discharge a spe-
cific duty of affirmative conduct imposed on corporations by law." Id. § 402(1)(b). The pro-
posed FC Code also would permit the imposition of liability for misdemeanors and strict
liability offenses arising from the conduct of any agent of the corporation who commits such
offenses within the scope of his employment. Id. § 402(1)(c)-(d).
18 Final Report, supra note 16, at 35. Significantly, the FC Code requires actual com-
plicity of management personnel; management's subsequent "ratification" of the agent's
misconduct or management's reckless toleration of the conduct in violation of a duty to
maintain effective supervision of corporate affairs is insufficient for criminal liability. Id.
In rejecting organizational liability based on "ratification" of an agent's conduct, the
VICARIOUS CRIMINAL LIABILITY
tors and executive officers as the de jure actors whose conduct
causes a corporation to incur criminal liability. Significantly, how-
ever, the FC Code goes further and also takes a functional ap-
proach to the question of who constitutes management in an or-
ganization. The acts of de facto management personnel, such as
employees without titles who are heavily involved in formulating
company policy or persons who supervise subordinate employees in
a managerial capacity, likewise may impose criminal liability on
the corporation.
Under this approach, corporate criminal liability may reach
actors embedded deep within a large corporate hierarchy.119 The
controlling inquiry focuses on the highest level person in the enter-
prise who bears individual criminal culpability for the acts. The
test, then, is whether the nature of that person's policy-making or
managerial responsibilities makes it fair and realistic to treat him
as a proxy for the persona of the organization, someone whose
character essentially reflects the character of the organization.
Under this test, the officers and key senior managers of a large or-
ganization would be viewed as the alter ego of the organization for
purposes of imputing criminal liability.
The MP Code takes a slightly broader approach, setting forth
two different standards120 under which to convict organizations of
crimes that require proof of a culpable mental state. The first stan-
dard applies to corporations for malum in se crimes, such as mail
fraud, larceny, and manslaughter, all of which are typically com-
mitted by individuals.' 2' Under this standard, a corporation may
be held liable for a crime committed by an agent, but only if the
offense "was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high manage-
rial agent acting on behalf of the corporation within the scope of
proposed FC Code follows traditional notions of criminal law holding that one may not be
held criminally liable for another's acts merely because the act was approved of after the
fact. See, e.g., Note, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HAxv. L. REV. 689,
708 (1930) (ratification of another's criminal act cannot form basis of criminal liability).
"0 See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (under MP Code, corporation liable
for acts within authority of agent and which benefit corporation).
12. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Develop-
ments, supra note 2, at 1251.
121 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1985). Eight states have adopted the MP
Code's standards of organizational liability. See Brickey, supra note 2, at 631, Another
twenty-one states have judicially or legislatively recognized a similar but more expansive
version of MP Code section 2.07(1)(c). Id.
1990]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:725
his office or employment."' 22
Like the FC Code, the MP Code defines "'management" func-
tionally; organizational liability is not limited merely to acts of the
company's formal management, such as the board of directors and
executive officers. Mere supervisory authority, though, is insuffi-
cient. The culpable actor's role must be high enough and broad
enough to justify treating his decisions as establishing the "policy,"
or the essential character, of the organization.
In contrast to the FC Code, however, the MP Code standard
permits the conviction of an organization if a lower-level agent
committed an offense that was "recklessly tolerated" by manage-
ment. Accordingly, the MP Code ensures that managers cannot
avoid organizational criminal liability by deliberately closing their
eyes to serious warning signals. 23
The second MP Code standard applies to crimes for which the
legislature clearly intended to hold organizations liable. 24 Because
antitrust, environmental, and federal securities laws are essentially
economic regulatory offenses, the focus of criminal prohibition is
on how the organization conducts its affairs. In this limited con-
text, the MP Code preserves respondeat superior as the standard.
132 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1985) (emphasis added). The MP Code flexibly
defines "high managerial agent" in the corporate context as "an officer of a corporation...
or any other agent ... having duties of such responsiblity that his conduct may fairly be
assumed to represent the policy of the corporation." Id. § 2.07(4)(c).
123 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); see Working
Papers, supra note 105, at 207-08 (collection of pertinent federal statutes).
... MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a) (1985). This section states:
(1) A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if: (a) ... the
offense is defined by a statute other than the Code in which a legislative purpose
to impose liability on corporations plainly appears and the conduct is performed
by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the
scope of his office or employment.
Id. (emphasis added).
Model Penal Code section 2.07(3)(a) establishes the standard for unincorporated as-
sociations. It states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(3) An unincorporated association may be convicted of the commission of an
offense if:
(a) the offense is defined by a statute other than the Code that expressly
provides for the liability of such an association and the conduct is performed by
an agent of the association acting in behalf of the association within the scope of
his office or employment.
Id. § 2.07(3)(a) (emphasis added). Under either section, the MP Code provides that the
respondeat superior standard should be displaced whenever a law defining an offense
designates a particular agent or agents for whose conduct the organization should be held
accountable. Id. § 2.07(1),(2),(3)(a).
VICARIOUS CRIMINAL LIABILITY
An organization is held criminally responsible if an agent at any
level committed the offense within the scope of his employment
and with the intent to benefit the organization. 125
Significantly, however, the drafters of the MP Code added an
affirmative defense to respondeat superior: an organization may
avoid liability if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
a "high managerial agent" '126 having supervisory responsibility over
the subject matter of the offense acted with "due diligence" to pre-
vent the crime. 27 According to the drafters of the MP Code, if the
appropriate officials actually have exercised "due diligence," then
imputed criminal liability serves no legitimate purpose in encour-
aging managerial supervision. If, however, management fails to
take reasonable steps to assure compliance with laws directed at
the organization's conduct, it is proper to hold the organization it-
self responsible for those crimes that are defined as uniquely orga-
nizational offenses.
Although there are some differences between the two Codes,
both the MP Code and FC Code recognize the importance of re-
structuring the federal courts' standards for organizational liabil-
ity. Each bases organizational liability more closely on the real
moral culpability of the organization. Under the principles embod-
ied in both the MP Code and FC Code approaches, personnel in
policymaking roles would have to be involved culpably in criminal
conduct, either by personal complicity or by a deliberate failure to
prevent the offense, before organizational liability would attach.
The organization would have, in essence, the prerequisite mens rea
for the imposition of criminal liability.
Under either Code, no longer could low-level employees thrust
criminal liability on their employing organization solely because of
their employment relationship. No longer could these same em-
'21 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (definition of "high managerial agent" in
MP Code).
XS MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (1985). Section 2.07(5) provides, in pertinent part:
(5) In any prosecution of a corporation or an unincorporated association for the
commission of an offense included within the terms of Subsection (1)(a) or Sub-
section (3)(a) ... it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponder-
ance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibil-
ity over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its
commission.
Id. (emphasis added).
127 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 comment at 154 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Approximately
six states have adopted the "due diligence" defense to respondeat superior criminal liabil-
ity. See Brickey, supra note 2, at 630.
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ployees impose criminal liability on their employers by acting in
derogation of company policy or in defiance of express orders from
their supervisors.
Although these proposals take the form of statutory revisions
to the criminal law, the federal courts should adopt them without
awaiting congressional action. The quest for a general congres-
sional overhaul of federal criminal law seems doomed because of
debates over controversial, but unrelated issues (such as the death
penalty). Since the federal courts as a matter of federal common
law created and defined the contours of vicarious criminal liability,
the federal judiciary has ample authority to draw on the principles
that animate the MP Code and the FC Code in reforming the
doctrine.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY UNDER THE RICO STATUTE
The best place to begin the reformation of respondeat supe-
rior is with RICO. Congress crafted RICO to play a very specific
mission in the overall fight against organized crime: through its se-
vere criminal penalties and treble damage civil remedies, RICO
was to thwart the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate
businesses.128 Both the structure of the statute and its legislative
history "establish without a doubt" that this was the principal pur-
pose underlying RICO's enactment.129 Courts and commentators
thus have recognized that Congress intended legitimate businesses
to be the main beneficiaries of RICO's provisions.
In actual practice, however, Congress' intent in this regard has
been thwarted. Indeed, legitimate businesses have become RICO's
principal target. Perhaps no other factor has led more directly to
this perverse result than the misguided rules of imputed organiza-
tional liability that many federal courts have adopted in interpret-
ing the RICO statute. Specifically, through two different doctrines,
these courts have imposed criminal and civil liability on organiza-
tions for the criminal acts of their agents and employees, regard-
less of their level in the organizational hierarchy and regardless of
whether they engaged in activity detrimental to the organization's
interest.
The first doctrine grows out of interpretations of RICO's sub-
stantive provision, which prohibits certain activities of "persons"
21 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981).
129 ABA Report, supra note 20, at 105; see Turkette, 452 U.S. at 589-90.
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in connection with their acquisition of, investment in, or conduct
of an "enterprise."' 130 On its face, RICO's statutory prohibition
seems to make clear that two differently defined entities must be
involved in any RICO action-a wrong-doing "person" and a sepa-
rate "enterprise"-and that only the former can incur RICO liabil-
ity."3' Nevertheless, legitimate businesses alleged to be the affected
"enterprise" repeatedly have incurred RICO liability; many courts
allow claimants to join them as defendants by imputing to them
the acts of their agents. By directly attributing the agents' acts to
the organization, these courts treat the organization as the "per-
son" committing the proscribed act.'32
Under the second doctrine, some courts have concluded that a
legitimate business cannot be named as both the "person" and the
"enterprise," but permit the same result through the application of
respondeat superior, or some other modified version.133 If employ-
ees or agents of a legitimate organization are found to be "persons"
liable under RICO, their employing organization becomes vicari-
ously liable.
Courts adopting either of these doctrines have justified impos-
ing RICO liability vicariously on legitimate businesses because
"culpable" organizations should not escape liability. 34 Yet, this ju-
dicial characterization of "culpable" organizations, uncritically in-
corporates the current federal rule on organizational criminal lia-
bility into the RICO context.13  While we have explained above
why this approach is objectionable with respect to federal criminal
law generally, it is particularly objectionable in the RICO context.
Indeed, the result of the incorporation of respondeat superior into
RICO has turned Congress' intent in enacting the statute on its
head. Instead of protecting legitimate businesses from infiltration
1' 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
M See id.
I See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
13 See Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md 1985) (alleged fraudulent acts of
sole shareholder and president of corporation imputed to corporation); Bernstein v. IDT
Corp., 583 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984) ("doctrines of apparent authority and respon-
deat superior will... further the statutory goals").
4 See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1986) ("where the
language in RICO permits liability against a culpable entity, courts should find that such
liability exists"); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 402 (7th
Cir. 1984) (RICO's primary purpose is to control those who actually profit from racketeering
activity and not their victims), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
35 See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (explanation and description of fed-
eral rule on criminal liablility of corporations).
1990]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
by criminals, courts punish legitimate businesses with RICO's
harsh civil and criminal penalties for having been infiltrated or
abused by these criminals.
Legitimate organizations should receive the protections of
RICO that Congress originally intended. Courts can achieve this
result by properly interpreting the statute and understanding and
applying respondeat superior principles correctly within the RICO
context. As later explained, courts should not, under any circum-
stances, treat organizations as both a liable "person" and an "en-
terprise" for purposes of RICO as some currently do. Rather,
RICO liability should be imposed on organizations only when the
conduct satisfies the standard for organizational liability embodied
in the FC Code and the MP Code: when an organization's high-
level managerial agents, officers, or directors have been directly
and culpably involved in criminal activity. Legitimate organiza-
tions would thus be protected from the "friendly fire" of RICO,
leaving only truly "corrupt organizations" subject to the statute's
harsh penalties, in accord with Congress' original intent.
A. Organizational Liability Under the "Person/Enterprise"
Rubric
RICO broadly defines "person" as "any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." '136
Similarly, the statute broadly defines "enterprise" as "any individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity. ' 13 7 Under the RICO statute, "persons" may not, in
connection with a pattern of racketeering activity, acquire, invest
in, or conduct the affairs of an "enterprise," or conspire to do any
of these prohibited acts.1"8 Thus, the statute by its terms indicates
that only the wrongdoing "person" who engages in the prohibited
conduct may be held liable for a RICO violation. 3 "
Given the broad definitions of "person" and "enterprise," vir-
tually any legitimate business organization can satisfy each defini-
136 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1988).
13 Id. § 1961(4).
136 Id. § 1962(a)-(d).
311 See Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1986) (person, not
enterprise, violates RICO); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190




tion simultaneously.1 4 As a result, from RICO's earliest usage,
courts have been forced to grapple with whether organizations may
properly be named as both the liable "person" and the affected
"enterprise." Specifically, courts have had to determine whether,
based on the acts of its agents, an organization may be the RICO
"person" who, in connection with a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity, acquires, invests in, or conducts its own affairs as an "enter-
prise." Although the language, structure, and legislative history of
RICO indicate that the same organization should not be chargeable
in both roles simultaneously, courts currently are split on this criti-
cal issue.
1. The Current State of the Law
Section 1962(c), the most frequently utilized RICO section,
has generated the greatest discussion among the courts on this is-
sue."" Section 1962(c) provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise . . . to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity ....
In civil actions brought under section 1962(c), the classifica-
tion issue is typically framed in the following manner: the com-
plaint first alleges that a legitimate business, through its employees
or agents, is the liable "person"; this "person," in turn, has con-
ducted the affairs of the "enterprise," which is the business organi-
zation itself.14' Courts are urged to condone such pleading not only
because it is arguably permitted by the broad definitions of the
terms "person" and "enterprise," but also because "Congress in-
tended to make a 'deep pocket' (in the person of the corporation)
liable where corporate agents engage in a pattern of racketeering
activity redounding to the benefit of the corporation.' 44
Ten of the eleven United States Courts of Appeals addressing
the issue have squarely held that the liable person and the enter-
140 See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th Cir.
1984) (language of § 1961 indicates that corporation satisfies definition of "person" and "en-
terprise"), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
141 See ABA Report, supra note 20, at 57.
142 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
143 See Haroco, 747 F.2d at 387.
144 Id. at 401.
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prise cannot be the same entity under section 1962(c).' 45 These
courts have rested this holding on two grounds. First, section
1962(c) expressly speaks in terms of a "relationship 1 46 between
two distinct entities, since the "person" must be "employed by or
associated with" the enterprise. Some courts have held that this
language "logically" leads to the conclusion that the same entity
cannot serve as both the enterprise and the person associated with
it. 147 As the Seventh Circuit has stated in this regard: "you cannot
associate with yourself, any more than you can conspire with
yourself.' ' 48
Second, these courts view RICO's legislative history as sup-
"" See, e.g., Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1489 (6th Cir. 1989)
(RICO claim properly dismissed where plaintiff alleged defendant was both "person" and
"enterprise"); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839
F.2d 782, 790 (D.C. Cir.) ("Logic alone dictates that one entity may not serve as the enter-
prise and the person associated with it"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988); Garbade v.
Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 831 F.2d 212, 213 (10th Cir. 1987) (cannot be both
"person" and "enterprise" within wording of section); Bishop v. Corbitt Marine Ways, Inc.,
802 F.2d 122, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d
28, 30 (1st Cir. 1986) ("statute envisions liability only when there is the specified interaction
between two entities"); Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985)
(§ 1962(c) envisions two entities), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright
Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1984) ("violation of section 1962(c) by a corporate
entity requires an association with an enterprise that is not the same corporation"); Haroco,
747 F.2d at 400 (statutory terms "contemplate a person distinct from the enterprise"); Rae
v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984) (enterprise cannot also be RICO defend-
ant); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 (8th Cir. 1982) (RICO claim dismissed for failure
to plead "enterprise" separate from "person"), aff'd en banc in pertinent part, 710 F.2d
1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); United States v. Computer Sciences
Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982) (" 'enterprise' was meant to refer to a being dif-
ferent from ... the person whose behavior the act was designed to prohibit"), cert denied,
459 U.S. 1005 (1983). But see United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 989 (11th Cir. 1982)
(aggregate and entity theories of corporations allow corporation to be both "person" and
"enterprise"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
Schofield, 793 F.2d at 30-31.
14 See, e.g., *Yellow Bus Lines, 839 F.2d at 790 (one entity is not enterprise and person
associated with it); Hirsch, 751 F.2d at 633 (enterprise must be independent from defend-
ant); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 400 (statutory terms "contemplate a person distinct from the
enterprise").
148 McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit stated
the issue in somewhat more colorful terms:
We conclude that 'enterprise' was meant to refer to a being different from, not the
same as or part of, the person whose behavior the act was designed to prohibit,
and, failing that, to punish.... [W]e would not take seriously, in the absence, at
least, of very explicit statutory language, an assertion that a defendant could con-
spire with his right arm, which held, aimed and fired the fatal weapon.
Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d at 1190.
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porting this reading of section 1962(c).14 9 Recognizing that the pur-
pose of the statute was to prevent the "infiltration" of legitimate
businesses by corrupt individuals, courts have reasoned that sec-
tion 1962(c) was crafted to punish only the natural person who
conducts the affairs of a legitimate business in an illegal manner.150
Thus, in light of RICO's legislative history, one court concluded
"that Congress ... designed section 1962(c) so that it reached the
criminal ["person"] but protected the victimized enterprise from
liability. ''152
Thus, courts have been virtually unanimous in agreeing that
the principal purpose of RICO would be thwarted if the "enter-
prise" were treated as the wrongdoing "person" under section
1962(c) and was subject to the criminal and civil penalties that
such a "person" incurs. 52 Surprisingly, however, many of the same
courts which argue that RICO's main purpose would be defeated
by application of respondeat superior principles fail to consider
this consequence when examining claims under sections 1962(a),
(b), and (d).
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Haroco, Inc. v. American
National Bank & Trust Co.'5 3 has been the most influential case in
the development of this peculiar dichotomy. In Haroco, the court
indicated that an organization cannot simultaneously be named as
both the culpable "person" and the victim "enterprise" in a section
1962(c) claim. T5 In dictum, however, the court suggested that this
conclusion is not proper when a section 1962(a) claim is at issue.155Section 1962(a) provides that it is "unlawful for any person who
149 See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 35,204 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Robert McClory) (RICO
intended to "deal fairly with all who might be affected" by it).
110 See Yellow Bus Lines, 839 F.2d at 790; Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d
308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985) (such distinction focuses on culpable party, recognizing that actual
enterprise often passive victim of racketeer), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Hirsch, 751
F.2d at 634 (congressional intent was to punish infiltrating criminals, not legitimate
corporations).
251 Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1986). Conceivably, an
artificial person such as a "front" or "dummy" corporation also could be the distinct "per-
son" charged with using the victim "enterprise" in a corrupt manner. The breadth of the
definition of "person" simply assures that RICO will reach this kind of corrupt actor as well.
But see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (legitimate businesses not
immune from consequences of criminal activity).
152 But see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981) (courts all but unani-
mous in refusal to read RICO as prohibiting only infiltration of legitimate businesses).
153 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
I'l Id. at 400.
,55 Id. at 401-02.
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has received any income derived.., from a pattern of racketeering
activity ... to use or invest, .... any part of such income ... in
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise.'156
The court first recognized that the enterprise may play the va-
rious roles *of "victim, prize, instrument or perpetrator" under the
various subsections of section 1962.5 The court then determined
that, as a matter of policy, organizational enterprises should be
held liable under RICO when they operate as the "perpetrator" or
"central figure in the criminal scheme.' 5 Although the Seventh
Circuit's holding under section 1962(c) insulates an enterprise
playing such a role from direct liability under that subsection, it
opined on the basis of section 1962(a)'s language that a similar re-
sult should not obtain:
As we read subsection (c), the "enterprise" and the "person"
must be distinct. . . . [However,] [s]ubsection (a) does not con-
tain any of the language in subsection (c) which suggests that
the liable person and the enterprise must be separate. Under
subsection (a), therefore, the liable person may be a corporation
using the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in its op-
erations. This approach to subsection (a) thus makes the corpora-
tion-enterprise liable under RICO when the corporation is actu-
ally the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of
racketeering activity, but not when it is merely the victim, prize,
or passive instrument of racketeering. This result is in accord
with the primary purpose of RICO, which, after all, is to reach
those who ultimately profit from racketeering, not those who are
victimized by it.159
Many courts have aped the Seventh Circuit's disparate treat-
ment of sections 1962(a) and (c) with respect to the person/enter-
prise issue. 60 Many courts also have extended the result reached in
"5 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
See Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401.
188 Id.
"' Id. at 401-02 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit subsequently
adopted the dictum in Haroco in its interpretation of section 1962(a). See Masi v. Ford City
Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1985) (literal meaning of statute in accord
with Sedima).
160 See, e.g., Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 841 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc);
Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., 884 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1989); Yellow Bus
Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpefs Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782, 790 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 (1988); Garbade v. Great Divide Mining & Milling Corp., 831 F.2d
212, 213 (10th Cir. 1987); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358
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Haroco on the person/enterprise issue under section 1962(a) to
claims brought under section 1962(b).'61 That section provides, in
(3d Cir. 1987); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th
Cir. 1987); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 29 (1st Cir. 1986); Long Island
Lighting Co. v. General Elec., 712 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Fillorama v. John-
stone, Lemon & Co., 697 F. Supp. 517, 523 (D.D.C. 1988); Philadelphia TMC., Inc. v. AT&T
Information Sys., Inc., 5 RICO L. Rep. 603, 606-07 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 1986); Bateman v.
Blaum, No. 86-2620 (E.D. La. Dec. 2, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Leavey v.
Blinder, Robinson & Co., No. 85-7018 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. 85-3108 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file); Vietnam Veterans of Am., Inc. v. Guerdon Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 951, 955-56
(D. Del. 1986); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 4 RICO L. Rep.
764, 772-73 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 1986); United States v. Freshie Co., 639 F. Supp. 441, 441-42
(E.D. Pa. 1986); Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 4 RICO L. Rep. 439, 444 (M.D. Pa. May 20,
1986); Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 643 F. Supp. 107, 109 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Conan
Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1167, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. Derry Const. Co., 617 F. Supp. 940, 943 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Fieldcrest Mills,
Inc. v. Congo Agencies, Inc., 2 RICO L. Rep. 181, 187-88 (D.N.J. 1985). But see United
States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982) (in reality, no dis-
tinction between corporate and individual), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); In re
Wedtech, 85 Bankr. 285, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("person" liable under RICO must be distinct
from "enterprise"); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. Financial Co., 697 F. Supp. 1058, 1067 (D.
Minn. 1988) (same), aff'd, 886 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Cantanella Sec. Litig., 5 RICO
L. Rep. 562, 565 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1987); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, 648 F. Supp. 419,
427-29 (D. Minn.) (§ 1962(a) construction obviating enterprise/person requirement contrary
to Eighth Circuit reading of RICO), aff'd on other grounds, 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1988); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp.
1188, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (§ 1962(a) requires same elements as § 1962(c)); Kredietbank
N.V. v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
fie), aff'd mem., 808 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1986); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 581 F.
Supp. 350, 357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Williamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Finance Co.,
577 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (D. Ore. 1984) ("person" under § 1962(a) is not same as
"enterprise").
161 See, e.g., Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1307 (7th Cir. 1987); Schreiber
Distributing Co., 806 F.2d at 1398; In re Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F.
Supp. 1466, 1474 (D. Colo. 1987); Faberge, Inc. v. Wyman, No. 82-6915 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie); Vietnam Veterans of Am., 644 F. Supp. at 957;
Derry Constr. Co., 617 F. Supp. at 943-44 ("It is perhaps arguable that [an enterprise],
through a pattern of racketeering activity, might gain an interest in or control of itself
through the purchase of outstanding shares of stock with the money from the pattern of
racketeering"). But see Official Publications, 884 F.2d at 668 (dictum) (§ 1962(b) should
follow construction of § 1962(c)); Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d at 1190 ("enterprise"
refers to different being than "person"); Pru-Bache Sec. v. Cullather, 678 F. Supp. 601, 609
(E.D. Va 1987); Medallion TV Enterprises, Inc. v. SelecTV, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1290, 1294
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (cannot be "enterprise" and "person" sued under § 1962(b)), afl'd, 833 F.2d
1360 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3241 (1989); Louisiana Power & Light Co, 4
RICO L. Rep. at 772; Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(defendant could not be both "enterprise" and "person" "seeking to subvert that enter-
prise" under § 1962(b)); Kredietbank N.V., No. 84-1903; Bruss Co. v. Allnet Communica-
tions Serv., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 401, 407 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (applying Haroco analysis, § 1962(b)
is construed same as § 1962(c)); Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1269,
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity . . . to acquire or maintain control of
an enterprise .... ,, 162
Like Haroco's interpretation of section 1962(a), these courts
have reached the same result based on section 1962(b)'s language:
in their view, it does not contain any of the language of section
1962(c) that would suggest that the liable person and the enter-
prise must be distinct.""8 Consistent with the principle established
in Haroco that only "perpetrator" enterprises should suffer RICO
liability, these courts deem liability proper under section 1962(b) if
the enterprise was the "direct or indirect" beneficiary of its agents'
or employees' criminal activities. 164
The result reached in Haroco also has been reached by some
courts with respect to the person/enterprise issue under section
1962(d), RICO's conspiracy provision. That subsection provides as
follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate
any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b) or (c) of this
section.' 5
Section 1962(d) does not refer expressly to an "enterprise"
like the other subsections of section 1962. As a result, some courts
have concluded, as Haroco did with respect to section 1962(a), that
section 1962(d) is not subject to the person/enterprise rule of sec-
tion 1962(c).16 6 As one court has stated in this regard: "In contrast
1271 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (enterprise must be wholly different from person statute was designed
to punish).
:62 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
63 See, e.g., Liquid Air Corp., 834 F.2d at 1307 ("Unlike subsection (c), which requires
a relationship between the 'person' and the 'enterprise' (employer-employee), subsections
(a) and (b) require only the use of an 'enterprise' by a person' ").
:4 See id.; Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d at 1397-98.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (emphasis added).
100 See Barkman v. Wabash, 7 RICO L. Rep. 289, 298 (N.D. 11. 1987); Faberge, Inc. v.
Wyman, No. 82-6915 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); HGN Corp. v.
Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Johnson & Williams, 3 RICO L. Rep. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
17, 1985); Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Congo Agencies, Inc., 2 RICO L. Rep. 181, 188-89 (D.N.J.
1985); Onesti v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1262, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1985). But
see United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982) ("enter-
prise" refers to different being from "person"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Pru-
Bache Sec. v. Cullather, 678 F. Supp. 601, 608-09 (E.D. Va. 1987) (proposition that RICO
enterprise cannot simultaneously be RICO defendant finds "compelling" support); Gaudette
v. Panos, 650 F. Supp. 912, 914 (D. Mass. 1987) (requirement of separation of "person" and
"enterprise" would be diminished if not imposed on § 1962(d)); Morris v. Gilbert, 649 F.
Supp. 1491, 1500-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (corporate entity may not simultaneously be "enter-
prise" and "person"); Kredietbank N.V. v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Oct. 30,
1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of
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to section 1962(c), there is no language in section 1962(d) sug-
gesting that the person and the enterprise must be distinct.'
167
Under this reading, the courts uphold a charge of conspiracy to
violate section 1962(c) where the enterprise and the person are the
same entity, so long as there is a sufficient indication that the en-
terprise was a "perpetrator."
Although most of these cases have involved civil damage suits,
their rationales and conclusions apply equally in criminal prosecu-
tions. Section 1962 simply defines the conduct that is forbidden,
and other sections 68 prescribe the civil and criminal penalties ac-
companying violations. Without minimizing the adverse impact of
civil treble damage liability that these decisions so cavalierly im-
pose on even legitimate organizations, their equal application to
criminal prosecutions makes them especially ominous.
Also, they are fundmentally unsound. Indeed, it is difficult to
understand why courts are so facile in expanding the restricted lia-
bility under section 1962(c) when they interpret the other subsec-
tions. In the section 1962(c) context, the courts aptly recognize
that they should not contravene Congress' overarching goal by im-
posing liability on the very type of legitimate organization that
RICO was designed to protect.16 9 Yet, they brush aside that con-
cern when considering RICO claims under sections 1962(a), (b),
and (d), casually applying principles of imputed liability because
the statutory language does not unmistakably forbid that result.170
By contrast, we submit that there are compelling reasons to treat
the distinction so clearly manifested in section 1962(c) as repre-
senting a pervasive restriction on imputed liability that should ap-
ply across the RICO landscape. Under this interpretation, an or-
ganization bears imputed liability only under standards similar to
those discussed in Part II. B. of this Article.
RICO not established because defendants failed to distinguish between "person" and "en-
terprise"), afl'd mem., 808 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1986); Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate
Bank, 590 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D. Or. 1984) (statute is clear that enterprise cannot be RICO
defendant), rev'd, 815 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1987).
267 Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 2 RICO L. Rep. at 187.
1' 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1988).
169 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
170 See Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839
F.2d 782, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 (1988).
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2. A Solution: A Uniform Person/Enterprise Rule
Courts should interpret sections 1962(a) and (b) consistently
with section 1962(c), which requires that the person and the enter-
prise be distinct entities. Moreover, RICO's legislative history
demonstrates that, if anything, the case for requiring a separation
between the person and the enterprise is even stronger for sections
1962(a) and (b) than it is for section 1962(c)."' The fact that sec-
tions 1962(a) and (b) do not contain the additional element that
the alleged person "be employed or associated with" the enter-
prise,172 does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the person
and the enterprise do not have to be distinct under those
subsections.
Sections 1962(a) and (b) facially indicate, in their use of the
distinct terms "person" and "enterprise," Congress' desire to sepa-
rate the wrongdoing "person" from an "enterprise" which may be
the victim or the instrument of the wrongdoing. Like section
1962(c), these subsections expressly speak in terms of two distinct
actors: the culpable "person" and the "enterprise" in which the
person invests his illicit proceeds or which he acquires or controls
through his illegal acts. 73 It is perverse to disregard this distinc-
tion simply because section 1962(c) happens to include another el-
171 See Final Report, supra note 16.
172 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
173 See, e.g., United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir.
1982) (enterprise refers to "a being different from, not the same as or part of, the person
whose behavior the act was designed to prohibit"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983);
CATV Support Serv., Inc. v. Magnavox CATV Sys., Inc., No. 3587 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("subsections of 1962 should be construed uniformly and
... the requirement of a distinct 'person' and 'enterprise' applies to each alike"); Neville v.
Logicon, 6 RICO L. Rep. 423, 423 (D.D.C. 1987) (corporation cannot be named both liable
individual and enterprise under any subsection of § 1962); In re Cantanella Sec. Litig., 5
RICO L. Rep. 562, 565 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1987) (not requiring person and enterprise to be
distinct entities under all subsections of § 1962, "would indeed warp the principles of statu-
tory construction, which is to interpret terms in a consistent manner and in harmony with
RICO's purpose"); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, 648 F. Supp. 419, 428 (D. Minn. 1986)
("consistent use of the two different terms 'person' and 'enterprise' throughout section 1962
indicates an intent to distinguish those actors throughout"), aff'd, 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir.
1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1197
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (statutory language indicates that person and enterprise were meant to be
distinct entities under each subsection of § 1962); Kredietbank N.V. v. Joyce Morris, Inc.,
No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("consistent use of the
words 'person' and 'enterprise' in the statute represents an intention to distinguish between
those actors throughout the statute"); Bays v. Hunter Sav. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020, 1024
(S.D. Ohio 1982) ("in all cases the person defined by the Act is the defendant and is always
distinct from the enterprise").
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ement that presupposes the distinction that sections 1962(a) and
(b) already draw. 1 4
Apart from the exegetical point that Congress' use of two dis-
tinct terms implies two different entities, the contrary interpreta-
tion of sections 1962(a) and (b) leads to rhetorical nonsense. A sen-
sible reading of section 1962(c) has led virtually all courts to reject
the notion that an organization can "associate with itself.' 17 5 Simi-
larly, however, "[t]here seems to be little distinction between an
[organization] associating with its own business affairs and an [or-
ganization] receiving illegal income to invest in itself.'17 6 Yet, that
strained and artificial result flows from blurring the person/enter-
prise distinction under section 1962(a).
A moment's reflection exposes a similar flaw in merging the
person and the enterprise under section 1962(b). One noted RICO
commentator has explained: "[b]ecause it is the shareholders who
own interests in a corporation or who control the corporation, it is
conceptually absurd to regard a corporation as owning an interest
in itself or controlling itself as contemplated by § 1962(b).' ' 7
At the very least, the language of sections 1962(a) and (b) is
not so clear that the courts are ineluctably forced to treat the "en-
terprise" as the same entity as the "person." Even if we concede
some abiquity on the point, settled principles of statutory con-
struction dictate that courts resort to RICO's legislative history.17 8
Courts which have relied on legislative history consistently have
held that the person and the enterprise must be distinct under sec-
tion 1962(c). 171 In reaching a contrary result under sections 1962(a)
and (b), however, many of these same courts have neglected the
174 Some courts have relied on RICO's liberal construction clause as authority for read-
ing subsections 1962(a) and (b) differently from subsection 1962(c), because a broad reading
of the former provisions makes it easier for plaintiffs to recover treble damages. See, e.g.,
Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 838-39 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing explicit policy that
RICO be liberally interpreted as reason why plaintiffs who do not meet § 1962(c) require-
ments still have section (a) relief available) (en banc). But cf. Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas
Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir.) ("general principle that RICO is to be accorded a
liberal interpretation cannot justify expanding section 1962(a) beyond the limits of that sub-
section's own language"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 76 (1989).
175 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
170 Note, supra note 21, at 595.
177 Tarlow, Criminal RICO Report, 5 RICO L. Rep. 214, 216 (Feb. 1987).
178 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979) (citing
rule of statutory construction that something within letter of statute may not be within
intention of makers).
17 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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critical task of examining the statute's legislative history. 180
RICO's legislative history unambiguously demonstrates that,
in its entirety, section 1962-not just subsection (c)-was aimed at
persons acting upon or through an enterprise. As explained by the
relevant legislative material discussing the general goal of section
1962: "Section 1962 establishes a threefold prohibition aimed at
the infiltration of legitimate organizations."'' This explanation in-
dicates that sections 1962(a) and (b) were designed by Congress so
that they, like subsection (c), would reach the criminal actor-the
"person" whose conduct is defined and penalized under each sub-
section-but protect the legitimate enterprise. 82 Congress' legisla-
tive goal is best promoted if sections 1962(a) and (b) are inter-
preted in the same manner as section 1962(c).
This conclusion is buttressed further when one considers the
differing transactions that Congress designed sections 1962(a), (b),
and (c) to regulate. Congress specifically designed sections 1962(a)
and (b)-in contrast to section 1962(c)18 3-to protect legitimate
businesses from "infiltration" by outside criminal interests. Section
1962(a), for instance, was designed to prohibit criminals from
"laundering" ill-gotten gains derived from a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity through investing them in a legitimate enterprise. 84
Under subsection (a), the enterprise plays the role of "prize" of
outside criminal interests or, at worst, a passive instrument, when
criminal interests are ensconced inside the enterprise and use it as
the receptacle of their "dirty" money. Congress vie'wed the legiti-
mate enterprise as worthy of protection, even though such an en-
terprise may have been nominally "benefited" by the infusion of
380 See supra text following note 150.
"I S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 159 (1969) [hereinafter SENATE REP.] (emphasis
added); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985) (relying on Senate
Report No. 617 for congressional intent behind term "pattern"); SENATE REP., supra, at 79
(where organization run by racketeering, persons involved are separable from organization).
182 Cf. Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1986) (in light of
RICO's purpose, logical that Congress would have designed § 1962(c) to reach criminal but
protect victimized enterprise).
183 See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, 648 F. Supp. 419, 428 (D. Minn. 1986) (§
1962(a) "portrays the enterprise as the investment object of the criminal violators"), afl'd,
829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987) , rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628
F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (§ 1962(a) "enterprise" is bounty purchased with racke-
teering profits); United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (§ 1962(a)
proscribes investment of "dirty money"); see also Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section
1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491, 1495 (1974).
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money into its operations. 185 Simply put, RICO's legislative history
indicates that section 1962(a) was not meant to impose liability on
a legitimate business "enterprise.' 18
6
Similarly, Congress drafted section 1962(b) to prevent crimi-
nal interests from taking over a legitimate business or controlling
it through criminal activities directed at that business. 87 Indeed, it
is under section 1962(b) that Congress' intent to protect legitimate
organizations-businesses and labor unions-against infiltration by
criminal interests is most apparent.'88 Indeed, it is hard to fathom
how a legitimate business enterprise could be the "perpetrator" or
"central figure" in the criminal activity contemplated under sec-
tion 1962(b). Instead, such an enterprise's role .invariably would be
that of the "prize" of outside criminal interests, or the "victim" of
racketeers who have already insinuated themselves into the
enterprise.
Thus, the raison d'etre of sections 1962(a) and (b) was to pro-
tect legitimate enterprises from infiltration, attempted takeover, or
actual control by criminal interests.18 If anything, therefore,
courts should be most hesitant to impute criminal and civil liabil-
ity on them, unless Congress unmistakably signaled a desire to do
so. Neither RICO's statutory language nor its legislative history
contains such a clear-and self-defeating-command.
The history of section 1962(c) underscores this point. Unlike
sections 1962(a) and (b), Congress did not design section 1962(c)
principally to protect legitimate businesses against infiltration by
outside criminal interests. Rather, Congress added it at the request
of the Department of Justice, primarily to create a means by which
to prosecute a criminal within the enterprise from using it as a tool
to commit or further conduct criminal activity. 90 Typically, a sec-
tion 1962(c) "enterprise" is the "perpetrator" or "central figure" in
188 See Rush, 628 F. Supp. at 1197.
188 See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1987) (§ 1962(b) does
not forbid enterprise from engaging in predicate acts, but forbids those predicate acts aimed
at consuming enterprise); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 313 (1983) ("section
1962(b) prosecutions involved. .. 'muscling' into businesses through loansharking, bribery,
extortion, or fraud").
188 See generally Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 661, 689-90 (1987) (violation of § 1962(b) does not require prior criminal
activity).
1869 See e.g., Tarlow, supra note 177.
180 See generally Lynch, supra note 188, at 682 (§ 1962(c) does not prohibit act of
infiltration per se, but criminal activities of racketeers).
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the criminal scheme because it has already been infiltrated, taken
over, or used by the "person" for criminal purposes.191 Despite this
fact, courts have almost uniformly-and correctly-found that a
section 1962(c) enterprise presumptively falls within the class of
victims that Congress sought to protect and thus bears no imputed
liability for the crimes the "person" commits through it."2
Since an infiltrated enterprise is properly protected from lia-
bility under section 1962(c), there is little doubt that legitimate
enterprises which are attempting to fight off infiltration also
should be protected from RICO liability under sections 1962(a)
and (b).9 s Legitimate enterprises covered under sections 1962(a)
and (b) are much more likely to be the innocent victims of a rack-
eteer's freestanding pattern of wrongdoing, which may have little
or nothing to do with the enterprise's affairs. 94
Thus, upon closer examination, the distinction some courts
have drawn between section 1962(c) and sections 1962(a) and (b)
contravenes RICO's statutory language, Congress' intent in passing
the statute, and the particular purposes sought to be served by the
various subsections of section 1962. Accordingly, the only legiti-
mate solution for a proper interpretation of section 1962 is to
adopt a uniform rule: under any properly pleaded RICO count, the
"person" violating the statute and the "enterprise" affected must
be separate entities."'s
191 Id.
192 See, e.g., B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1984) (one
of RICO's congressional purposes "was to prevent the takeover of legitimate businesses by
criminals and corrupt organizations"). "It is in keeping with that Congressional scheme to
orient section 1962(c) toward punishing the infiltrating criminals rather than the legitimate
corporation which might be an innocent victim of the racketeering activity." Id.
191 See Lacovara & Nicoli, supra note 21, at 3.
, See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1331 n.11 (5th Cir. 1983)
("[s]ection 1962(b) forbids the takeover of an enterprise by illegal means"), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1005 (1984); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (§
1962(a) "contemplates an enterprise which can be entirely unrelated to the predicate acts").
195 Some courts deem the distinct person/enterprise rule satisfied where the organiza-
tion is named as the liable "person" while at the same time being named along with its
employees as the supposedly distinct "association in fact" enterprise. See, e.g., Petro-Tech
Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1361 (3d Cir. 1987) ("vicarious liability for the
employer of RICO persons may be appropriate . . . even if the employer is also the RICO
enterprise"); Cullen v. Margiota, 811 F.2d 698, 729-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1027
(1987); LSC Assoc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 629 F. Supp. 979, 983 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
But see Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1489 (6th Cir. 1989) (plain lan-
guage of statute precludes person from simultaneously being enterprise); Yellow Bus Lines,
Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782, 789 (D.C. Cir.) ("logic
dictates that one entity may not serve as the enterprise and the person associated with it"),
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The "separate entities" rule should also encompass RICO con-
spiracy claims brought pursuant to section 1962(d). Courts which
have not required a separate person and enterprise under section
1962(d) fail to recognize that section 1962(d) is derivative; it
merely relates back to conduct prohibited by sections 1962(a)
through (c). Because of its derivative nature, it is nonsensical to
interpret section 1962(d) as criminalizing a conspiracy to engage in
conduct for which the enterprise would bear no substantive crimi-
nal liability.
Moreover, if a court interprets section 1962(d) inconsistently
with sections 1962(a) through (c), plaintiffs or the government
could "end-run" that prohibition under those subsections merely
by alleging a RICO conspiracy under subsection (d).19' In this re-
spect, the antitrust laws, after which many aspects of RICO were
modeled, 97 provide a useful insight: a corporation cannot "con-
spire" with its own employees.'98 Accordingly, courts should apply
the same analysis to a section 1962(d) claim with respect to the
"person/enterprise" rule as is applied to the substantive subsection
on which the conspiracy claim is based.9 9 A nonculpable enter-
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 (1988); Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 808 F.2d 438,
441 (5th Cir. 1985) (evidence of enterprise separate and apart from pattern of activity must
be presented to jury), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1032 (1987); American Bonded Warehouse
Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 653 F. Supp. 861, 867 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (complaint
that defendant corporation was both enterprise and liable person dismissed); Tarasi v.
Dravo Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1235, 1236 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (application of agency theory violates
Hirsch rule that "enterprise" and "person" must be distinct); Rokeach v. Eisenbach, No. 85-
C-1106 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1985). The courts following this approach, however, have misunder-
stood a crucial point: an "association in fact" consisting of a legitimate business and its
employees is no different from the legitimate business itself, since a business cannot operate
other than through its employees or agents. See American Bonded, 653 F. Supp. at 867;
Tarasi, 613 F. Supp. at 1237. Accordingly, an "association in fact" enterprise consisting
solely of a legitimate business and its employees should be subject to the separate person/
enterprise rule, because the person and the enterprise are really one and the same.
196 Cf. Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1361 (rejecting use of respondeat superior in § 1962(c)
context on same grounds); Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir.
1986) (same).
7 See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987) (RICO and Clayton Act are both aimed at compensating same injuries with same
penalties); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489 n.8 (1985) (RICO legislative
history indicates reliance on Clayton Act).
193 See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984)
(under § 1 of Sherman Act, corporation cannot conspire with subsidiary).
109 See Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (cor-
poration generally incapable of engaging in RICO conspiracy when only other conspirators
are employees); McClendon v. Continental Group, 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1510-11 (D.N.J. 1985)
(same); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1541-42 (W.D. Pa.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
prise cannot be treated as conspiring with the "person" who plans
to misuse it.
B. Imputed Liability Under Respondeat Superior Principles
Resolution of the question of organizational liability raised by
the "person/enterprise" issue does not answer fully whether orga-
nizations may be held liable under RICO for the acts of their em-
ployees and agents. The Supreme Court has indicated that where a
federal statute proscribes conduct and explicitly imposes liability,
in the absence of contrary congressional intent, normal rules of
agency law should apply.200
The federal courts are sharply divided in deciding whether
Congress intended to narrow the scope of imputed liability under
RICO.201 The answer to this question, however, need not turn on
the presence or absence of specific congressional attention to the
issue; statutory language, structure, and purpose mark a clear
enough path. 0 2
The signposts under RICO suggest a distinctly narrowed scope
of imputed criminal or civil liability. Presumptively, the person/
enterprise dichotomy suggests that the legitimate organizational
enterprise is to be protected against the consequences of the
wrongdoing "person's" crimes, including resultant penalties.
RICO's severe penalties were aimed only at "corrupt" or truly
"culpable" organizations. Adoption of the principles embodied in
the FC Code and MP Code approaches to organizational liability
would harmonize interpretation of RICO with its legislative intent.
1. The Current State of the Law
Courts are split on whether legitimate businesses may be held
vicariously liable under RICO for the misconduct of their employ-
1984) (same).
200 American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 569
(1982).
21 Compare Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1986) ("there
is unlikely to be a situation, in the absence of an express statement, in which Congress more
clearly indicates that respondeat superior is contrary to its intent") with Bernstein v. IDT
Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984) ("nothing in RICO [n]or its legislative history
... suggest[s] that the normal rules of agency law should not apply to the civil liability
created by that statute").
202 See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 456 U.S. at 570; see also Petro-Tech, Inc.
v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1356 (3d Cir. 1987) (common-law doctrines will be
applied in federal litigation to extent they advance goals of relevant statute).
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ees, and if so, what standard should apply."°' Thus far, the deci-
sions addressing the issue primarily involve civil treble damage
cases, but the split affects criminal RICO prosecutions as well.
Roughly five different judicial approaches have emerged. First,
some courts have held that organizations are liable under the
traditional common-law doctrine of respondeat superior.204 Under
this doctrine, an organization is liable for the torts of its agent if
(1) the agent's conduct comes within the scope of his employment;
(2) the agent acts with apparent authority; or (3) the organization
ratifies the agent's wrongful conduct.2 05 Thus, an organization may
be held vicariously liable for treble damages under RICO according
to this approach, even when its employee did not act for the bene-
fit of the employer, or acted in defiance of organizational policy.
20 6
The rationale for adopting the respondeat superior standard
in the RICO context is set forth in Bernstein v. IDT Corp.,207 the
seminal decision advocating this approach. In Bernstein, the plain-
tiff had named an organization both as the liable person and the
affected enterprise under section 1962(c). The defendant organiza-
tion sought to dismiss the claim on the grounds that the plaintiff's
pleading violated the "person/enterprise" rule. The court, however,
declined to resolve the issue, discarding it as academic because the
organization, in any event, would bear responsibility for the wrong-
ful acts under respondeat superior.05
The Bernstein court noted that the Supreme Court in Ameri-
can Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.,209 has
held that normal rules of agency law should apply to violations of
federal antitrust statutes unless Congress evidenced a contrary re-
20 See infra notes 204-35 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., In re U.S. Oil & Gas Sec. Litig., No. 2217 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1988) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Connors. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 434, 446-47 (E.D.N.Y.
1987); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Express, 658 F. Supp. 1331,
1342 (D.P.R. 1987); Tryco Trucking Co. v. Belk Store Serv., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1327, 1336
(W.D.N.C. 1986); Morley v. Cohen, 610 F. Supp. 798, 811 (D. Md. 1985); Bernstein, 582 F.
Supp. at 1083; cf. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 987-89 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying
same standard in context of criminal RICO liability), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
2' See, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 456 U.S. at 556-67; Nathan, Corpo-
rations as Defendants and Enterprises Under Civil RICO: What's in a Name?, 1 RICO L.
Rep. 213 (July 1984).
206 See, e.g., Bernstein, 582 F. Supp. at 1083 (applying general rules of agency to im-
pose liability on wrongdoer's employer).
20 582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984).
208 Id. at 1083-84.
209 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
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sult.21 ° The Bernstein court determined that the same rules of
agency should apply in the RICO context as well. The court
concluded:
I perceive nothing in RICO or its legislative history which would
suggest that the normal rules of agency law should not apply to
the civil liability created under the statute. To the contrary, as in
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, it appears to me that
application of the doctrines of apparent authority and respondeat
superior will, at least in most instances, further the statutory
goals. 11
Thus, Bernstein reflects the most expansive approach to orga-
nizational liability under RICO; even if an enterprise has been in-
filtrated, and even if it has been a victim of its employees' criminal
conduct, it is subject to RICO treble damage liability just as it
would be for any other common-law tort.
A second approach taken by some courts is slightly more re-
strictive. Under this approach, vicarious RICO liability is imposed
on organizations when their employees or agents act within the
scope of their employment with the intent, at least in part, to ben-
efit the organization.212 This standard is essentially similar to the
standard that federal courts traditionally have applied to organiza-
tions in the criminal law context. 13
In practical terms, this approach is also very expansive. As
previously discussed, liability under this standard is thrust on a
legitimate business even for acts of low-level employees that con-
travene company policy, and acts that may amount to infiltration
210 Bernstein, 582 F. Supp. at 1083 (citing American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 456
U.S. at 569).
211 Id. at 1083-84. Another court has stated that respondeat superior liability under
RICO "is simply a reality to be faced by corporate entities. With the advantages of incorpo-
ration must come the appendant responsibilities." In re U.S. Oil & Gas Sec. Litig., No. 2217
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
212 See, e.g., San Jacinto Say. Ass'n v. TDC Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1579, 1580 (M.D. Fla.
1989) (where employees acted with intent to benefit corporation, motion to dismiss on re-
spondeat superior grounds inapplicable to RICO denied); Woods v. Piedmonte, 676 F.
Supp. 143, 147 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (brokerage house liable under RICO where investment
broker took money from customers but did not make requested investments); Hunt v.
Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (D. Mass. 1986) (liability imposed if agent motivated
by any appreciable extent by principal's business); D & S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, No.
82-C-5279 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Wagman v. FSC Sec.
Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 92,445 (N.D. IlM. July 23, 1985); In re Olympia Brewing Co.
Sec. Litig., 1 RICO L. Rep. 823, 837-38 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1984).
2' See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text (discussing development of organiza-
tional liability in criminal law context).
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or other activities that ultimately may have victimized the busi-
ness.214 If some intent to benefit the company is shown, even if no
actual benefit was ultimately realized, a legitimate business may
suffer the penalty of treble damage liability as well as exposure to
criminal prosecution. " '
A third approach taken by some courts imposes vicarious lia-
bility on legitimate businesses only when the evidence is sufficient
to show that high-level organizational personnel or agents were in-
volved in the criminal activity. Under this approach, high-level
managerial involvement is critical because it establishes that the
organization itself was a "central figure" in the alleged criminal
activity.216
Representative of this approach is Gruber v. Prudential-
Bache Securities, Inc.217 In Gruber, the plaintiffs sought to impose
liability on a brokerage house for the alleged wrongful acts of non-
managerial employees. In determining whether the -brokerage
house should be held vicariously liable, the court noted that the
federal policy underlying RICO was to protect legitimate busi-
nesses from outside criminal interests.218 The court approved the
distinction drawn by other courts between "aggressor" organiza-
tions-the "central figures" in the criminal scheme-and "con-
duit" organizations-those unknowingly facilitating illegal behav-
ior.219 Imposition of vicarious RICO liability is proper in the
former case, the court reasoned, because RICO's purpose of
214 See id.
215 See Wright, supra note 21, at 630. As other courts have pointed out, even where
some actual benefit has been accorded an organization by its low-level employees' criminal
conduct, it does not follow that the imposition of RICO treble damage liability is appropri-
ate. See, e.g., Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 165, 181 (D. Conn. 1987)
(corporation's benefitting from illegal behavior not equivalent to corporation's participation
as "central figure" in illegal behavior).
216 See, e.g., Greyhound Fin. Corp. v. Wiyard, No. 16040 (D. Utah Dec. 23, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (summary judgment where defendant had no knowledge
of or participation in fraud of employees); K & S Partnership v. Continental Bank, N.A.,
127 F.R.D. 664, 670 (D. Neb. 1989) (judgment for defendant N.O.V. because evidence estab-
lished that employees' activities did not further corporate policy); Capalbo v. Paine Webber,
Inc., 694 F. Supp. 1315, 1319-21 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (claim dismissed as plaintiff failed to allege
acquisition of enterprise by defendant employer through racketeering activities); Gruber,
679 F. Supp. at 181 (corporation liable where it is "central figure"); Onesti v. Thomson
McKinnon Secs., Inc., No. 85-C-4375 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 759-60 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (low-level corporate exec-
utive acting without sanction, insufficient for RICO application against corporation).
217 679 F. Supp. 165 (D. Conn. 1987).
218 Id. at 180.
219 Id.
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thwarting the infiltration by organized crime would be well served;
in contrast, that purpose would not be served if "malefactors at a
low corporate level could thrust [RICO] treble damage liability on
a wholly unwitting corporate management and shareholders. "220
With these principles in mind, the Gruber court determined
that an organization could be deemed a "central figure" or "aggres-
sor" only where an "officer or director had knowledge of, or was
recklessly indifferent toward, the unlawful activity."' 221 The plain-
tiffs failed to meet this standard and the court refused to impose
vicarious liability.2 22 Under this approach, organizations may face
single-damage tort liability for the acts of their low-level employ-
ees and agents; organizations will not, however, have RICO's "pu-
nitive, financially ruinous treble damage remedy ' s or criminal ex-
posure thrust upon them for activity their management neither
encouraged, nor condoned.
The fourth approach to organizational liability follows the
"person/enterprise" debate.224 In section 1962(c) cases, RICO's un-
derlying purpose of protecting legitimate businesses from RICO
treble damage liability is given full effect. Under this approach, a
business may not be named as both a "person" and an "enter-
prise" in the same count under section 1962(c), nor may it be held
derivatively liable under traditional or modified agency princi-
ples.225 While applying this bright line rule with respect to section
1962(c), many of the same courts do in fact hold legitimate busi-
nesses liable, either directly or vicariously, under the remaining
subsections of 1962 for the acts of their low-level employees so long
as the business was the direct or indirect beneficiary of those
220 Id. at 181 (quoting Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9
(N.D. IM. 1982)); see also Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("it
would be an anomalous result indeed if, because [the employee] had misused his authority
... and had actually violated internal guidelines of the [organization] by so doing, the [or-
ganization was] nonetheless deemed 'aggressor' enterprises liable under RICO").
221 Gruber, 679 F. Supp. at 181. The Gruber court also suggested an alternative basis
for imputing RICO liability to an organization. If an organization's "policies foster the rack-
eteering activity that is at the heart of RICO's prohibitions," then the organization can be
held liable for those policies. Id. (quoting Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28,
30 n.33 (1st Cir. 1986)). In the facts before the Gruber court, however, the court found that
none of the brokerage house's policies fostered the alleged scheme. Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
22 See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.




The Third Circuit's decision in Petro-Tech v. Western Co. of
North America227 best illustrates the fourth approach. In Petro-
Tech, the Third Circuit, which previously had held that an organi-
zation could not be both the "person" and the "enterprise" under
section 1962(c),22s rejected the plaintiff's argument that respon-
deat superior principles should be invoked to hold the "enter-
prise" liable for the acts of its employees who were named as "per-
sons" under such a count. The court reasoned that Congress did
not intend enterprises to be held liable under any circumstances
under section 1962(c).229 Accordingly, the court declined to use re-
spondeat superior to circumvent that rule.23 °
The court, however, did not evidence equal concern for legiti-
mate businesses named as enterprises under section 1962(a). The
Third Circuit joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits by holding
that an organization can be named as both the liable "person" and
the affected "enterprise" under section 1962(a) when the organiza-
tion is either the direct or indirect beneficiary of its employees'
pattern of iacketeering activity.2 31 Moreover, the Third Circuit ex-
pressly approved the use of respondeat superior principles under
section 1962(a), even where the enterprise is a legitimate busi-
ness.23 2 Accordingly, through either route, the Third Circuit en-
sured that legitimate businesses may incur liability under section
1962(a) if they gain a "direct or indirect" benefit from their em-
ployees' wrongdoing. The net effect of this approach channels
RICO claims away from section 1962(c) and toward other subsec-
226 See, e.g., Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639,
839 F.2d 782, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 (1988); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western
Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1361 (3d Cir. 1987); D&S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, 838 F.
2d 964, 967 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988); SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser
Indus. Inc., 852 F.2d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3241 (1989); Liquid Air
Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1307 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 5241 (1989);
Schofield, 793 F.2d at 33; Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401-02 n.18; Reinfeld v. Riklis, 722 F. Supp.
1077, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Grimsley v. First Alabama Bank, No. 16042 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 15,
1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); In re Posey, 81 Bankr. 416, 421-22 (N.D. Miss.
1987); Herman v. Jefferson Bancshares, Inc., No. 9977 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file).
227 824 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987).
228 Id. at 1358 (citing E.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984)).
229 Id. at 1359.
220 Id. at 1359 & n.11. -
21 Id. at 1360-61; see Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-WeU Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393,
1398 (9th Cir. 1986); Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402.
232 Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1361.
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tions of section 1962, where RICO plaintiffs can bring broad prin-
ciples of imputed liability to bear. against legitimate businesses.
The fifth and final approach completely rejects the application
of respondeat superior to RICO claims. Some of the courts follow-
ing this approach have reasoned that RICO's emphasis on punish-
ing the individual malefactor rather than the legitimate business
by whom he is employed leaves no room for vicarious liability.233
Representative of this approach is a decision by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, where, quoting
the authors of this Article, the court stated:
Alternative theories of imposing liability on an enterprise, such as
respondeat superior, are at odds with the purpose and language of
RICO: [S]ome courts have imposed direct RICO liability on legit-
imate businesses when they are alleged to be both the person vio-
lating the statute (through the acts of their employees and
agents) and the affected "enterprise" . . . [S]ome courts have
held legitimate businesses vicariously liable under RICO for the
acts of their lower-level employees and agents under traditional
principles of respondeat superior.
Under both lines of authority, courts have justified the impo-
sition of liability on legitimate businesses for the acts of their
agents or employees on the ground that "culpable" entities
should not escape liability under RICO. In attempting to effectu-
ate that goal, however, these courts have paid insufficient atten-
tion to what actually constitutes a "culpable" entity under RICO,
as evidenced by RICO's express statutory language and its under-
lying purposes. Indeed, these courts have painted with such a
broad brush that they have created a costly anomaly: a statute
233 See, e.g., Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230 (8th Cir. 1987) (corporate RICO
liability cannot be based on respondeat superior alone); First Nat'l Bank v. Lustig, 727 F.
Supp. 276, 280 (E.D. La. 1989) ("respondeat superior can never be the basis for liability for
a civil RICO suit"); Robinson v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 674 F. Supp. 243, 248 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (liability not imposed on corporation absent showing that it exists "to insulate a
wrongdoer"); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188, 1196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (§
1962(a) "was not intended to convict the infiltrated enterprise, but the violator of the predi-
cated acts"); Intre Sport Ltd. v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 625 F. Supp. 1303, 1309 (S.D.N.Y.)
(corporation only liable when also perpetrator), affd, 795 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1986), vacated,
482 U.S. 922 (1987); Kredietbank N.V. v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) ("liability under RICO may not rest on theory of respon-
deat superior"), af'd mem., 808 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1986); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare,
N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 835 (N.D. IlM. 1985) ("Respondeat superior is clearly
an insufficient basis for liability under RICO"); Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 548
F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (low-level employees should be unable to thrust RICO
liability on "unwitting corporate management").
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enacted for the primary purpose of protecting legitimate busi-
nesses from infiltration by outside criminal interests has created
liability for the infiltrated entity.23
Other courts rejecting the application of respondeat superior
in the RICO context typically do so in conjunction with their hold-
ing that an organization may not be both a "person" and an "en-
terprise" under the various subsections of section 1962. Its use is
barred because, otherwise, plaintiffs could circumvent the required
distinction between the affected enterprise and the person who is
the violator of the statute.235
This final approach provides legitimate businesses full protec-
tion from RICO liability, essentially barring all organizational lia-
bility under RICO. It also extends protection from RICO liability
to "aggressor" enterprises and other organizations that, through
their high-level managerial personnel, are central figures in crimi-
nal activity. Drawing a circle of protection that broadly, however,
frustrates Congress' goal of punishing the corrupt while protecting
legitimate organizations.
2. Resolution of the Issue: Organizational Liability Based on the
Principles Embodied in the Proposed FC Code and MP Code
The five judicial approaches to organizational liability in the
RICO context all, to a certain degree, attempt to answer the rele-
vant inquiry posed by the Supreme Court: Will the application of
traditional agency principles, or some variation thereof, advance
the goals of RICO? 236 Most approaches, however, fail to focus suffi-
ciently on what are the principal goals of the RICO statute. The
goals warrant application of the revised standards for imputed lia-
bility proposed in the FC Code and the MP Code.
Undoubtedly, the principal goal of the statute is to protect le-
23 Robinson, 674 F. Supp. at 247-48 (quoting Lacovara & Nicoli, supra note 21, at 1 &
n.26).
"I See Beverly Hills Sav. v. Highfield Assocs., No. 14019 (D.N.M. Aug. 28, 1987);
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Brent Liquid Transp., Inc. v. GATX Leasing Corp., 650
F. Supp. 467, 474-75 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Gaudette v. Panos, 644 F. Supp. 826, 841 (D. Mass.
1986), modified, 650 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mass. 1987); Continental Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon
Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 439-40 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Lynn Elecs. v. Automation Mach. & Dev.
Corp., No. 86-2301 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Walso Bureau,
Inc. v. Underwriters Adjusting Co., No. 85-5896 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file).
236 See Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1360; Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d at
33; Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402.
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gitimate organizations from the infiltration of organized crime and
other criminal activity. Yet, the approaches discussed above that
permit the broad application of respondeat superior principles de-
feat this goal by thrusting ruinous criminal responsibility and
treble damage liability on legitimate organizations whose low-level
employees engaged in criminal activity without the knowledge or
acquiescence of the organization's management.
Another frequently identified goal is to strip the ill-gotten
gains from those who ultimately profit from racketeering activities
associated with a RICO violation.37 Some of the approaches de-
scribed above, however, leave no room for organizational liability
principles in the RICO context, or do so in a niggardly fashion,
which defeats this goal as well.
One approach, however, fully squares with both of these pur-
poses underlying the RICO statute. Specifically, the approach
which imposes criminal and civil RICO liability on organizations,
but only when their high-level managerial agents, officers, or direc-
tors are culpably involved in the alleged racketeering activity, best
satisfies both policy goals of RICO.238 Such an approach, consistent
with the principles embodied in the MP Code and the FC Code, is
the correct approach under RICO for the same reasons that it is
the soundest approach under federal criminal law generally.23 9
Indeed, RICO dramatically illustrates the wisdom of the MP
Code and FC Code focus on ,the existence of an organization's
"moral culpability." RICO purportedly was designed to protect le-
gitimate businesses, and to punish "corrupt organizations;" the lia-
bility principles embodied in the Codes do precisely that. Each ap-
proach recognizes that high-level organizational personnel such as
officers and directors occupy policy-making positions which, in
practicality, establish the organization's goals, methods, and essen-
tial character. People at that level are actually the "soul" or
"brain" of the organization. If they decide to commit a crime in
their organizational capacity, the organization by definition loses
its right to be considered a "legitimate business" worthy of protec-
tion under RICO; it is, instead, a "corrupt organization" and is
properly subject to the full force and effect of RICO's penalties. 240
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text (discussing third approach set forth
in this article).




In contrast, if the organization's agent who engaged in the
criminal activity does not occupy a position that involves establish-
ing the organization's policies, his criminal activity simply cannot
be deemed sufficient to cause the organization itself to be deemed
corrupt. Rather, his criminal activity should be regarded, at least
for RICO's purposes, as a personal frolic. This rule should apply
even though the employee holds a title, such as vice president or
partner, that in fact does not entitle him to determine the organi-
zation's fundamental policies and, thus, its character. 24'
At the same time, the Codes' standards amply satisfies RICO's
concern for recovering the illicit financial rewards derived from
racketeering. Injured parties will be able to recover treble damages
from corrupt organizations whose management directed or set in
motion the criminal activities in question. Unlike other approaches
to organizational liability under RICO, the proffered approach
even permits injured parties to recover treble damages from cor-
rupt organizations in a section 1962(c) action.
Similarly, under the MP Code and FC Code standards, the
burden of criminal fines and civil treble damage actions will fall on
those organizations-and only those organizations-whose man-
agement uses the organization for purposes prohibited by RICO.
Under such circumstances, it is entirely fair to have the organiza-
tion, and thereby its owners, pay the consequences for its manage-
ment's culpable conduct.
When a non-policy-making agent or employee engages in
RICO criminal activity, he may be compelled, like the corrupt or-
ganizations described above, to give up the financial fruits of his
crime and twice that amount again. Not holding the employing or-
ganization vicariously liable for RICO treble damages in such a cir-
cumstance, however, does not leave that entity with a windfall of
ill-gotten gains, even if the organization benefited from its agent's
criminal conduct. Virtually any RICO violation causing injury or
generating gain also will constitute an actionable tort such as
fraud, arson, or extortion. As a result, the organization will be lia-
ble for single damages under traditional respondeat superior stan-
241 See, e.g., Gruber, 679 F. Supp. at 181 n.31 (vice president at brokerage house had
less authority than name of title would suggest); Intre Sport Ltd. v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
325 F. Supp. 1303, 1309 (S.D.N.Y.) (although defendant employee was "vice president" of
defendant employer, he was only one of "hundreds" of such vice presidents at company,
many of whom not involved in company management), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1986),
vacated, 482 U.S. 922 (1987).
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dards applicable to other federal and state common-law tort
claims.242
In sum, our proffered standard is neither over-inclusive nor
under-inclusive. The MP Code and FC Code standards targets
RICO's severe criminal penalties and civil liabilities on organiza-
tions that have, in both legal and practical terms, exhibited charac-
teristics of a corrupt organization; at the same time, the standard
protects legitimate businesses and labor unions from the use of
RICO against them. This proffered approach advances the princi-
pal goals of RICO better than other approaches. Consequently, it
should be the approach adopted by courts that endeavor to deter-
mine whether and when to impose organizational liability under
RICO.
CONCLUSION
The current imputed criminal liability doctrine that holds
sway in the federal courts is fundamentally flawed. It is premised
on respondeat superior principles that are concerned with distrib-
uting loss caused by tortious acts; it has virtually no connection to
"moral culpability," an indispensable element of criminal liability
for any intent-based crime. Under federal criminal law, therefore,
organizations are improperly tainted in this crucial respect.
The approaches for organizational liability urged by the Model
Penal Code and the proposed Federal Criminal Code would rem-
edy this patent flaw in our federal criminal jurisprudence. These
approaches, which judge an organization's moral culpability by the
actions of its officers, directors, and other high-level managerial
agents, would ensure that the criminal liability of organizations
turns on the actual blameworthiness of those persons who may
fairly be regarded as proxies for the organization's policy and char-
acter. Thus, a standard that would embody this crucial principle
should be adopted as the general rule in the federal courts for
judging organizational criminal liability.
24 See, e.g., Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230 (8th Cir. 1987) (corporation
suffered financial loss from frauds of subsidiary's employees); Gruber, 679 F. Supp. at 181
(conduit businesses made to bear liability for acts of employees that are basis for RICO
claim); Kosch v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co., No. 83-C-4832 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 1984) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (corporations liable for frauds of high-level employees); see also
ABA Report, supra note 20, at 360 (federal civil rules regarding respondeat superior govern
liability of corporation for tort damages of even low-level employees); Note, supra note 21,
at 605 (corporations bear civil liability for agent's torts).
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This approach further provides the correct standard for deter-
mining organizational liability under RICO in both criminal and
civil cases. Congress intended that RICO protect legitimate organi-
zations from persons using the organizations as part of their pat-
tern of racketeering. The principles embodied in the Model Penal
Code and Federal Criminal Code provide ample protection for le-
gitimate organizations, while simultaneously imposing the full
weight of RICO's penalties on the principal target of the stat-
ute-truly corrupt organizations.

